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ROBERT WARD
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza
340 East 2nd North Street
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-4412
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144
Idaho State Bar Number 4442

E

OCT 2 1 2009
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T EARLS, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
Case No. CV09-8175

WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual,

AFFIDAVIT OF BERNARDINO
BARRAZA

Plaintiff,
vs.

BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any), LIOBALDO GARZA, an
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED
IN EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN
AS 29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO,
Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO,
COUNTY OF

)
) ss.

011t0£E,)

BERNARDINO BARRAZA, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
That I am the Defendant in the above-entitled action and I make this affidavit based
upon my own personal knowledge and belief. All statements provided herein are true and
correct to the best of my knowledge, and I am competent to testify to the matters as stated
herein.
1.

On March 6, 2001, Juan Manuel Cuevas sold the real property commonly

AFFIDAVIT OF BERNARDINO BARRAZA l

9.M.

0001-70

I

I

known as 29452 Pearl Road, Parma, Idaho, (the "real property") to me per written contract.
2.

On May 6, 2002, I recorded a lien with the Canyon County Recorder's

Office against the real property since Juan Manuel Cuevas failed to transfer title of said
real property to me.
3.

Prior to Juan Manuel Cuevas initiating any legal action, Plaintiff, Wilfrido

Cuevas, called me and requested copies of payments and any documents I had in my
possession regarding the transaction between Juan Manuel Cuevas and myself with
reference to the real property.
4.

Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, told me that Juan Manuel Cuevas was now

wanting to sell the real property to him and that Wilfrido knew that Juan Manuel Cuevas
had previously sold the real property to me.
5.

Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, told me that I should demand a refund of all

monies paid to Juan Manuel Cuevas for the real property, so that Wilfrido could buy the
real property instead.
6.

Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, and I discussed retaining an attorney to ensure

that Juan Manuel Cuevas was fair and dealing honestly with both parties.
7.

I went to meet with Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, about three (3) days after our

conversation but Wilfrido refused to speak with me.
8.

My attorney, Robert Ward, and I called Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, shortly

thereafter. Wilfrido stated in his conversation with Robert and I, that I had lost all rights to
the real property per the Statute of Limitations. Wilfrido further stated that he was no
longer interested in retaining an attorney to deal with the purchase of the real property from
Juan Manuel Cuevas, and was at that time renting and maintaining the real property since it

AFFIDAVIT OF BERNARDINO BARRAZA - 2
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belonged to Juan Manuel Cuevas. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, said that Juan Manuel
Cuevas was family, and that he no longer wanted to discuss the real property issue with me.
9.

On April 2, 2007, a quiet title action commenced on the real property

between Juan Manuel Cuevas and me.
10.

In May of 2007. Juan Manuel Cuevas obtained a default judgment on the

real property which was timely set aside by the Idaho Court of Appeals.
11.

May 24, 2007, I filed my Answer and Counterclaim with the court attached

to the Affidavit of Counsel.
12.

My Answer and Counterclaim alleged quiet title as a cause of action.

13.

My Answer and Counterclaim was filed in the manner as required by

I.R.C.P. S(d) and (e).
14.

My Answer and Counterclaim was served upon Juan Manuel Cuevas as

evidenced by the Certificate of Mailing, on May 23, 2007, in a manner as required by
I.R.C.P. S(a) and (b).
15.

On June 20, 2007, while the appeal process was pending, Juan Manual

Cuevas apparently quitclaimed his interest in the real property to Plaintiff, Wilfrido
Cuevas. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas', own affidavit states that he was aware of the lawsuit
and my claims. He also stated in his affidavit that he was aware of my recorded lien and
that he went to the title company to search records. It is my understanding and belief, that
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, was aware at this time that Juan Manuel Cuevas could not give
clear title to the real property. I believe a quitclaim deed was executed between Juan
Manuel Cuevas and Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, because they couldn't get a clear title
through the title company.

AFFIDAVIT OF BERNARDINO BARRAZA - 3
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16.

On June 24, 2008, the Idaho Court of Appeals entered its Opinion, granting

my Motion to Set Aside Juan Manuel Cuevas' default judgment.
17.

On January 15, 2009, Mark D. Perison, attorney for Juan Manuel Cuevas,

withdraws as attorney of record.
18.

On March 17, 2009, I obtained a quiet title judgment to the real property.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
DATED This

;21)

day of October, 2009.

De

O:::Zc,.rcb fa c
Bernardino Barraza

A c.,y .--c 2 S

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this o2J) day of October, 2009.

AFFIDAVIT OF BERNARDINO BARRAZA - 4
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon t h e ~ day of October, 2009, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza by the method indicated
below, addressed to the following:
REBECCA A. RAINEY
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK
& FIELDS, CHTD.
P.O. BOX829
BOISE, ID 83701
FAX: (208) 385-5384
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Hand Delivered
-~Overnight Mail
_,,___

FAX

1

'

EXHIBIT "A"

0001.75

9l.~000

1)0/)
~

t

f?J,~

bl . ~

1

~,-~11)~
..•.....~'·, · jt,·j

i:;;;; ~::-(: ,- ··. (:,~ i,:: ,~-:fl ,'?f,~~d .• •;

~at~~~-;.,·.·lfrl1J· .··1,1rfti~t' ,.
.

~ ' - _, _---'"(G.?" "

,---1
-... ,~
.. .

. . ··.. f:J<., , . . ,.._.'

.~.

7b;;.

~-!

·,;t·;~-6 ·(:~-l-(.TI.Aif;!i.. ·;.

.·

. .

· .

·

.

.

1-.e;

.

.

. ~~ :
',

. . . . . ,__,,.

.

.

:~-~".?-l;v?,QP~d

·

i: -

.

-:-·, :J.~

· ,_. , ..;.

~£

(j,

·

s~-~-.. , . __ . . ... .

I

t

!
-·

.

i

I

l,

1 '

EXHIBIT "B"

0001.77

.. '
'

:

'

INSTRUMENT NO.

~oo 0-c)...0!:>'!3

STATE OF IDAHO

CLAIM oF LIEN

)
:ss

COUNTY OF Cany:on, · )
BEFORE ME. the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared Bernardino Barraza and
L~i::..:o:.:b:.;:a:..::l:.:d~o--=-G=-a=-"rz:;.;a:::......_ __,, who being first duly sworn, says that he is the lienor herein or the

agcntofthclienorherein, whoseaddressis 16558 Blue Spruce Rd. Nampa, Id, 83,651.

and that in accordance with a contract with Juan Manuel Cuevas.
lieno~ furnished labor, services or ~terials consisting of unpaid rgfund in the ama\Jnt
$20.000.00 for the payments oi R~al estate Title,
on the following described real property in

Canyon

County, State ofldaho, and more fully

described as
"Exibit A" Attched and made part hereof.
and owned by Juan Manuel Cuevas and Yrene Baez sigle persons.
for a total value of Twenty thousand dlls and 00/100

•

dollars (~0.000,~0

of which there remains unpaid Twenty thousand d11s and 00/lO~ollars (SZO. ooo, ai.o

That the lienor furnished the first of the items on the fifth

dayo~anuary

and that ~e licnor furnished the last of the items on the fifth day of January

, 200.£..
200.L,

That the lienor served copies of the notice on the contractor on the 7th day ofinarch . 2002,
I

20Q_by _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _...;, and on the subcontractor on the _ _ _ day of

_ _ _ _ __,200_by _ _ _ _ _ _ _~ ~ ~ - r - - - - - 7 ' : h

WI

seal.

: Namp§, Id, 83651. ·
My Commission expires: 10/02/07.
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EXHIBIT ''C''

000180

. r '

Mark D. Perison, Bar No. 4804
MARK D. PERISON, P.A.
314 S. 9th Street, Suite 300
P. 0. Box 657 5
Boise, Idaho 83707-6575
Telephone: (208) 331-1200
Fax:
(208) 343-5838

F I

A.~r:fu 9M.

A?~ o2 2007
ttANVON COUNTY CLERK

. . D. BUTLER, DEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

JUAN MANUEL CUEVAS and
YRENE BAEZ, individuals

)
)
)

Plaintiffs,

)
)
)

vs.

BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an
individual, LIOBALDO GARZA,
an individual, and DOES I
through X, unknown claimants to
the real property described in
Exhibit "A" hereto, commonly
known as 29452 Pearl Road,
Parma, Idaho,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.

~I} 0 7r J 53 {o

COMPLAINT TO QUIET TITLE
AND FOR DAMAGES

)

)

COME NOW the Plaintiffs herein, by and through its counsel of record, and

COMPI.AINT TO QUIET TITLE -- Page I
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'

complains and alleges as follows:

I.
Plaintiff Juan Manuel Cuevas is an individual currently residing in Arizona.
Yrene Baez is an individual currently residing in Arizona. Cuevas and Baez are
owners of real property located in Canyon County, more particularly described in
Exhibit "A" hereto, that is the subject of this action. This parcel shall be referred to
herein as "the Property" and is commonly known as 29452 Pearl Road, Parma,
Idaho.
II.

Defendant Bernardino Barraza and Defendant Liobaldo Garza are individuals
whose current residence address is unknown to Plaintiffs.
III.
The subject matter of this suit is real property located in Canyon County,
Idaho, which is more particularly described on Exhibit "A" hereto. Defendants claim
an interest in said property and jurisdiction is therefore appropriate under Idaho
Code§ 5-514.

IV.
Defendants DOES I through X are persons or entities whose true names
and identities are unknown to Plaintiff and who have or may assert some claim to the
Property. Plaintiff shall substitute the true names and identies of such parties upon
their discovery pursuant to I.R.C.P. I0(a)(4).

COMPIAINT TO QUIET TITLE -- Page 2
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V.

This action is a request for a judgment quieting title in Plaintiffs to property
located in Canyon County, the value of which exceeds $10,000.00, therefore venue is
proper in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Canyon County.
VI.

On May 6, 2002, Defendants recorded a lien against the subject property as
Instrument No. 200220593 in the County Recorder's Office of Canyon County. A
copy of the lien is attached hereto as Exhibit "B." According the lien, a notice of the
claim upon which the lien was based was served upon the "contractor" on March 7,
2002.
VII.

The lien filed by Defendants asserts a claim against the Property for unpaid
amounts claimed due for "labor, services or materials consisting of unpaid refund in
the amount $20,000.00 for the payments on Real estate Title."
VIII.

Plaintiffs have disputed that any such amounts are due or that Defendants
have a right under any law of the State of Idaho to file such lien.
COUNTONE
(Quiet Title)

IX.
To date, no foreclosure action has been commenced by Defendants to foreclose
the lien.
COMPLAINT TO QUIET TITLE -· Page 3
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X.
Although it is unclear to Plaintiff the exact nature of the lien, it appears to be
based either upon the mechanic's lien statutes of the State of Idaho, Idaho Code
§ 45-501,

et seq. or upon a claim of breach of contract.
XI.

The filing of a foreclosure action if the lien is a mechanic's lien is barred by
Idaho Code § 45-510 and, according to that code section, said lien has expired.

XII.
If the lien is based upon an alleged breach of contract, an action to enforce

that contract, whether or written or oral, has expired by the passage of more than five
(5) years since the accrual of the cause of action and is barred pursuant to Idaho
Code§ 5-216 and/or Idaho Code §5-217. In the lien, the Defendants note that they
served copies of their lien on "the_contractor" (identified as Plaintiff Juan Manuel
Cuevas) on March 7, 2002. Because Defendants knew of the existence of the claim
at least by that date, and have failed to act within five (5) years, said claim is now
barred.

XIII.
The continued existence of the lien upon the Property constitutes an unlawful
cloud upon the title of Plaintiffs.

XIX
Plaintiffs have previously demanded that Defendants remove the lien from the

COMPLAINT TO QUIET TITLE -- Page 4

0001.84

record because it constitutes an unlawful cloud upon Plaintiffs' title and Defendants
have refused.

xv.
Plaintiff seeks a judgment of this Court quieting title in the name of Plaintiff
and against all other claimants once notice to such potential claimants has been
provided.

XVI.
Defendants refusal to release the subject lien is frivolous and without legal
justification, making an award of attorney fees appropriate under Idaho Code§ 12121 and 12-123.
COUNTTWO
(Slander of Title)

XVII.
The claim of lien filed by Defendants was filed without a legal basis for doing
so and was done for the sole purpose of slandering the title of Plaintiffs in order to
extract some advantage therefrom.

XVIII.
The filing of the lien constitutes a slander upon Plaintiffs title for which
Plaintiff should be awarded damages.

XIX.
The slander upon Plaintiff's title was done frivolously and without legal
justification and an award of attorney fees is therefore appropriate under LC. § 12COMPLAINT TO QUIET TITLE -- Page 5
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121 and/or 12-123. An award of fees in the amount of $5,000.00 is an appropriate
amount should judgment be taken by default.

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for a Judgment from this Court as follows:
I.

For Judgment and Decree of the Court declaring that the lien of

Defendants is for all purposes released from the property to the same extent as if
Defendants had executed a voluntary release.
2.

For Judgment quieting title against any other claimant (currently Does I

through X) subsequently identified as an entity claiming an interest in the Property.
3.

For entry of Judgment against Defendants in an amount to be proven at

trial for slander of Plaintiffs title.

4.

For an award of Plaintiffs' attorney fees.

5.

For an award of Plaintiffs costs.

6.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.
MARKD. PERISON, P.A

Dated: March/' ~2007.
erison •• Of the Firm
s for Plaintiffs

COMPWNT TO QUIET TITLE -- Page 6
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A part of the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter, Section 19, Township 6
North, Ra11ge 5 West, Boise Merjdian, Canyon County, Idaho, more p11rtJcularfy
described to-wit:

Com1ne11clng at the Southwest corner of the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast
Quarter, Section 19, Township 6 North, Range 5 West, Boise Meridian; the
INITIAL POINT of thJs description; thence
North 0°07' East 924 feet, along the West line of the s11id Southwest Quarter of the
Southeast Quarter; thence
South 55°15' East 336.82 feet; thence
South 0°07' West 730 feet, parallel to the said West line, to a point on the South line
of the said S01dhwest Quarter .of the Southeast Quarter; thence
South 89°35' West 277.15 feet, along the said South line to tbe INITIAL POINT OF
THIS DESCIUPTIQN.

EXHIBIT A

000187
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INSTRUMENT NO. -;;..oo ?).d--.. 0!::>'13

CLAIM oF LIEN

STATE OF IDAHO

)
:ss
COUNTY OF Canyon. · )
BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public. personally appeared Bernardino

Barraza

artd

L_i;a.;;o_b;.;:;a..=l:...:::d=o.._;.G=a;..rz=-a"'--_ __,, who being first duly sworn, says that he is the lienor herein or the

agentofthelienorherein, whoseaddressis 16558 Blue Spruce Rd. Nampa, Id, 83,651.
and that in accordance with a contract with Juan Manuel Cuevas.
licnor furnished labor, services or m~terials consisting of unpaid refund in the amount
$20.000.00 for the

payments o~ R~al estate Title,

on the following described real property in

Canyon

County, State ofldaho, and more fully

11 Exibit 1\"
described as
Attched and made part hereof.
and owned by Juan Manuel Cuevas and Yrene Baez sigle persons.

for a total value of Twenty thousand dlls and 00/100

dollars

(~o, ooo. !P,O

of which there remains unpaid Twenty thousand dlls and 00/lOQloJJars (~0.000,(1).0

That the lienor furnished the first of the items on the fifth

dayofJanuary

and that ~e licnor furnished the last of the items on the fifth day of January

• 2002...
, 200.1....

That the lienor served copies of the notice on the contractor on the 7th day ofinarch . 20~2 ,
200-_bt _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __. and on the subcontractor on the _ _ _ day of
_ _ _ _ _ _, 200_ by _ _ _ _ _ _ _-:----,,....._,.._.------r.-:b.

EXHIBIT B
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1 A p1rl of the SouthweH Qunttr of the 5fl11thent Quarter, 5ectinn l9, Tnwn~nlc;, 6 tcortt.,

I~:;;;~.;;::;~;:;;;;:;.~~;:::';;:;:~;,:~;;:;;,;;::;;;;;:;:~;;::;::;;;;,,
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· ·
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South 89 degrees 35' \lest 277,16 feet, 110119 the uid South Hne to the lNJllf; . POINT
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F

MAY 152007

MARK D. PERISON, PA.
314 S. 9th Street, Suite 300
P. 0. Box 6575
Boise, Idaho 83707-6575
Telephone: (208) 331-1200
Fax:
(208) 343-5838

JUAN MANUEL CUEVAS and
YRENE BAEZ, individuals
Plaintiffs,

vs.

BERNARDINO~ an
individual, LIOBALDO GARZA,
an individual, and DOES I
through X, unknown claimants to
the real property described in
Exhibit "A" hereto, commonly
known as 29452 Pearl Road,
Parma, Idaho,
Defendants.

~.l,-1h_9

.M.

Mark D. Perlson, Bar No. 4804

2~01

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

rmv 17 Prl

ll

2s

CANYON CQur..iry I"'!
J HSIDf:MA" It "'LEAK
N,Ot!f*U'f'Y

Case No. CV07-3536

JUDGMENT

The Defendants and each of them having been regularly served with process

and having failed to answer within the time limited therefor by law, and the default

JUDGMENT - Page I
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of each such Defendant having been entered herein;
NOW, TIIBREFORE, Upon application of coW1sel for the Plaintiff, and upon
the Affidavit of Plaintiffs counsel that none of the Defendants is an infant or an

incompetent person, nor now in the active military service of the United States of
America;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED As follows:
Title to the real property set forth in Exhibit "A" hereto, and commonly
known as commonly known as 29452 Pearl Rnad, Parma, Idaho, is qui~ted in the

name of JUAN MANUEL CUEVAS and YRENE BAEZ, as against the claim asserted

by Defendants BERNARDINO BARRAZA and LIOBALDO GARZA in Instrument
No. 200220593, Official Records of Canyon County and said Instrument is hereby

RELEASED from the property for all pw:poses to the same extent as if Defendants

had executed a voluntary release, and Defendants BERNARDINO BARRAZA and
LIOBAIDO GARZA shall have no further right. title or interest in and to the real

property described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
DATED: This __lL day of May, 2007.

RENAE HOFF

JUDGMENT-· Page 2
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A part of tbe Southwest Quarter of tho Southeast Quarter, Section 19, Township 6
North, Range 5 West, BoJBe Meridian, Canyon County, IMho, more pnrticularly
described to-wit:
Commencing nt the Southwest corner of the Southwest Quarter of tho Southeast
Quarter, Section 19, Township 6 North, Range 5 West, Boise Meridian; the
INITIAL POINT of this description; thence
North 0°07' East 924 feet, nlong the West Une of the said Southwest Quartw the·
Southeast Quarter; thence

of

South 559 15' East 336.~ feet; tflence
South 0°07' West 730 feet, parallel to the said West line, to II point on the South line
of tbe said Soothweat Quarter of the Southeast Quarter; thence
South 89°35' West 277JS feet, along the said South line to the INmAL POINT OF
THIS DESCRIPTIQN.

EXHIBIT A

0001.93

EXHIBIT "E"
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''

ROBERT WARD
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD
Attorneys far Defendant Bernardino Barraza
340 East 2nd North Street
M00.ntairt. Honn,, Idaho 8364 7
Telepbone: (Zl)&} 5.$7:.4412

F I L ·-- E. g

-----AMI-! I t.J PM.
MAY th -;IDW

Facsimile: (208) 58.7-3144

CANYON COONJY CLERK

b.SUTLE::R.DEPOTY

Idaho State Bar Number 4442

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF CANYON

JUAN MANUEL CUEVAS and YR.ENE
BAEZ, individuals,

Case No. CV-07-3.536
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN

Ptaintifts,

SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET

ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
PURSUANT TO RULE 60~)

vs.
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual,
LIOBALDO GARZ~ an individual, and
DOES I thro.ugh X, unknown claimants to the
real pt-0J>efty·descmbMJn Exhibit '~A'',

commonly known as- 29452 PeatLRoa4,
P~I~,

1,
I
I
I
I
I

}

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF ELMORE

)
) ss.
)

ROBERT WARD, bein,g first duly swo~ deposes and states as follows:
L That I am the Attorney for the Defendant Bernardino B ~ in the aboveentitled actiort.

I make this Affidavit in Support of Defendant's Modon to Set Aside

Default Judgment Rursuant tQ Rule 60(b).
2. That Defendant discussed this· case with me, and paid me for my legal advice;

however, at that tune. no lawsuit was filed a1lQ. tlrerefore I could not file a Notice of
Appearance on behalf of Defendant.

~0Rl6INAL

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT'OF MOTJO{jTOSSTASlDB JUDGMENT PlJRSUANT T0
RULE OO(bJ - 1

000195

3. A Complairit was later filed and Defendant was served with the Complaint, but
did not tell :m¢,_ thus, rte> Answer and Colil1tetclaim was filed.
4. Defendant believed that I was representing him after our· di~cussfons regatdfog
the case, and therefore had the mistaken belief that he did not need to let me know that a
lawsuit had been filed and a lady had.given him papers as service ofprocess.

5. De&niant ~ales very little Englisli, cartrtot read.or write English, and thus did
not understand the netice in the. Summons requiririg, hhn to

m~ a. -r~ponsive pl~ding

within twenty (20) days.
6. Defendant has a meritorious

def~use as outlined in the proposed Answer and

Coumerelabn attached hereto, and inoorporated.·as if set forth infull hereu,.._
7. Defendant respectfully requests the Court to set aside the default judgment

entered m this ease and allow Defendant to file the Answer and. Counterclaitn attached

.FURTHER., YOUR AFFIANT SArTH: NAUG:ftf.

.DA~ 1hls• ~l;- day of May, 2007..
HALL,,FRIEDL¥ -~ WARD

AFf'ltJAYIT OF COUNSEL iN SUPPOR-TOFMOTION TO SET ASIDE JUOOMENTPURSUANT TO
RULE 60(b)- 2.

0001.96

CERTlFitATE~:S~YICE

I Hl!REBY CBR.11FY that upon the ~ o f May, 201l1, l <!lulled to be setved
a true a:nd correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit ofCounsel in Support of Motion to Set
Aside Juqgtnent Pursuant to Rule 60(b) by the method indicated below, addressed to the
following:

MARK D. PERTSON, P.A.
3149 S. 9TH STREET, SUITE 300
P..O. Bo~ 6575
BOISE, ID 83 701-6575

/U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
FAX

(208) 331... 1200

(208) 34J. .583'8 FAX

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MonoN TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO
RULE 60(b)-j

000197

ROBERT WARD

HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza
3:40 East 2nd North Street

Nfum.·.'tam
Honie
83647
.
... , Idaho
..
telephone.: (l08) 581-4412'
.

Facsimile:· (208) 587-3144
Idaho State Bar Number 4442

IN TI-IE D1STRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JtIDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF CANYON

JUAN MANtJBL CUEVAS and YRENE

.,.
I
I

Case No. CV-07-3536

I
I

BABZt individuals
. .
. .
.,

.I
j

I

Plaintiffs.

I
I

'

ANSWB:RAND

vs.
COUNTERCLAIM
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual,
LIOBALDO GARZA;. an individual, and
DOBB I through X, unknown claimants to the
real PI"Operty .deseti:bed. in :Exhibit ''AJ',
eW.tmiOtdy knt>wn,as 29452 Pearl Roa~

Fee Category; J(8)(a)

Panna,Jdah'o,

Fee: $.62.00
I

Defendants.

I

,I.
l
I

'

I
I

I
I

ANSWER
COMES NOW, Defendant Bernardino Barraza., by and thro.ugh his attorney of
record., Robert Ward of the firm Hall, Friedly & Ward, and in answer to the Complaint

fi:led herein by the Plaintiffs, admits, denies and alleges as foHows;

AASWE& ANO COUNTERCLAIM - I

0001.98

I'

I.
The Defeooa,nt denies each and every allegation of the Complaint not hereinafter

specifically admitted.

IL
Defendant adttn'ts the allegations contained in paragra~ m, IV, V, VI, VII, IX, X
and XI of Plaintiffs1 Complaint to Quiet Title.

m.
Defenda,rit.denies the' allegations contamediD.paragraphs II, :xIIi xrrt XIV, XVI~
XVII, XVIIl and XIX.of Plaintiffs' Complaint t:e Quiet Title~
IV.
Itt response to paragraph I of Plaintiffil Complaint to Quiet Titlt, Defeedant admits

only that Plaintiff Juan Manuel Cuevas is an individual cunently residing in Arizona, and
tha,t Pl~ti.tf Yttn~ Baezis an irulividual currently residing in Arizona. Defendant denies

V.
In response to paragraph VIIl of Plaintiffs' Complaint to Quiet Title, Defendant
~ only tha.t PlamtUfa' dispute tha¢ they owe Defendant rnoner,

and deirles the

VI.
,

fn respollSe to paragraph XV of Plaintiffs.' Complaint to Quiet Title, Defendant

.

admits only that Plaintiff seeks Quiet Title, and denies the remainder ofsaid paragraph.

0001.99

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs sold to Defendant the Property as descri®dill. Plaintiffs; CornpJaintto

Quiet Title;,
Therefore, Defendant is the owner of'the property>and not Plaintiffs.
. ·.
.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plain.tiffs should be, equitably estopped from denying they sc;,ld the property to

Plaintiff and estopped from asserting their claim for Quiet Title to the property.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
More than five y®rS have elapse:d since Plaintiff sold ~e property to Defendant
th~fore Plmntilf' s claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

COUNTERCLAIM,

For tause, otaction against the Plaintiffs, the:O~fendantBetilaroino Barraza
CQDlpluiD$:,.and,~Jeg~ as folk>V1S1 ·
I.

The :Plaintiffs, to the best of Defendant,s knowledg¢, are residents ofthe State of

Arizona.

n.
The Defendant. Bernardino Barraza, is rrow and has been during ail of the times
mentioned hereiii"a resident of Canyon County, Iclaho.
Ill.

The subJect of this litigation is real property located in Canyon County, Idaho,

known as,29451 Pearl Road, Parma, and whichis more a:tromately described in Exhibit A

ANSWER.AND COUNTERCLAIM-3

000200

..... . .
of the Plaintiffs' Complaint to Quiet Title. Exhibit Ais incorporated herein by this

reference as if set forth in its entirety. Defendant claims an interest msaid property, and
jurisdiction is appropriate under Idaho Code§ 5-514.

RB.BACH OF WB'.IJ'IEN CONJM,CT
IV.

Plaintiff' ~ecuted a written contract on Match 6, 2001, wherein Plaintiff' sold the

V.
Defendant Bernardino Barraza paid a total eftwenty-1:Wo thoU$$lf.l;six hundred
thirty-five dollars and seventy-six cents' ($22,63'5.76) as a down paymenton the subject
property.

VI.
Plaintiffs now claim the subject propett;y was not sold to Oefettdant

VIL
Plaintiffs ,mive now flled a Quiet Title a:etfon·, and therefore have breached the
written contract wherein they sold. the subject property to; Defendant.

BR,BAG,ROF ORAL CQNIMC!

vm.
Plainuffs}iromised ro reimburse Deiendanttwenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00)

.

IX.
Defendant vacated the subject property.

ANSWER ANDCOUN1BR.CLAIM • 4

00020:1

.....

'
\.- ..

,

X.

Plaintiffs~ .as of tllis date,. have failed to: reimburse Defendant the twenty thousand
dollars ($20,000.00) as promised.
XI.

Plaihtiffs have now tiled this Quiet Tif:le action to avoid paying Defendant twenty
thousand dollars ($20,000;00). as promised, and therefore have bteached tho oral contract of
the parties.

BltRACtl OF JMPLJ'.IID.It-l"FACT CONTRACT

xn.
D~ndant incorpol'Q.tes paragraphs I - XII of Defendant~s Counterolaitn into this
cause ef action as if set forth in their entirety

xm.

Defendants have now breach~ the implled:.in-fact contra.cfby nling a quiet title
action to avoid paying Defendant bis $20,000.00.

UNJUST BNmCHMENT

xv.
Defendant incorporates pan1graphs I - XIV ofDefendants Counterclaim
into this
.
.

cause of action as if set forth in their entirety.

•·

000202
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I

XVI.
Plaintiffs have filed a Quiet Title action in an attempt to negate Defendant's interest
in the property and avoid paying Derenda,nt twenty thousand dollars; ($20,.000. 00) as

:promised, all of which would result in an unjust enritnrnent to Plaintiffs.
BQUITABLEESTOPPL:§

XVII

Pltlllltiff:t~n1ed to Defendant be would rchnburse Defendant twenty thousand
d ~ ($20;000.00) if Defendant would vacate the proplffl}'.

xvm
Plaintiff intended Defendant to act upon his representation and vaetite the prope.t1y.
XIX
Plaintiff has now filed a Quiet Title action. to avoid pa~ Defendant the twenty

thousand. dollars. ($201000.QO) as represented;.

xx
Defendant was unaware that Plaintiff wQUid refuse to :reimburse him as Plaintiff
~p~~.

~

D~nt :relied upc,n Plaintifrs ,repmsent4tian to him.
XXII

Defendant acteti" upon Plaintiff's representation .and vaca.ted the property.

ANSWER AND·coWPBRCI..AIM - 6

000203

.

.. .
QUIETmLE

xxm
The defendant incotporates into this cause of action paragraphs r~XXII of
Defendant's 'Cotlliwrtlaim as if set forth in·fuIL

xxrv
Defendant claims a cause of action against Plaintiffs a:nd complains ofPlamliffs
named in

this ootion and all other persons unknown clau:ning $1Y right, title, esta~~ lien ()t

intwest lo the r-1. pn1perty described adverse to plaintiff's title, and for a cause of action
alleges the following.
XXV

Tixrtnie names or capacities. whether individua!, ~rate, associate, or otherwise,

of Cross Clahnants -named in this-action as Does I through X are unknown to Defendan¼
who $Ues such Cross Claim~ts by such fietitious ll3Dles,.and .Defendtmt wiU amend this

The defendant is the owner of'real property l00$ted in Canyon County, Idaho,

known as,29452 PearlR.oad, P ~ and whfoh is more accurately described in Exhibit A
ofthe Plainti:.ffa' Complaint to Quiet Title. Exhibit A iJ inoorpo01,ted herein by this

reference as if set forth in its entirety.

Plaintiffs claim. an interest and estate in such property adverse to' Defendant;
Plaintiffs' claim is witho~ anydght, and Plaintiffs have no right, estate, title, lien or
interest in or to the property,. or any part ofit:

ANSWER.AND CotlNtBRCtAIM - 7
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I

XXVIII
Cross Claimants Does I through Doe X, may claim some estate, right, title, lien or
interest in or to the property adverse to Plaintiff" s title, and such claµn or clainis constitute
a cloud on Defendant's title to ~e property.

D¢fendant has retuned the law finn of Hall, Frie<Jly & Ward of Mountain Homet
Idaho, to prosecute this aetion on Defendant~s behalf and has agreed to pay said attorneys a
reas.onable fee for their services. The sum of$] 50.00 per hour is a reasonable sum to be
paid for such attorney's fees.

XXX
Defendant is entitled 10 recover his attorney fees incurred in th() prosecution of this
counterclaim against the defendantpursuantto Idaho Code§:§ 6-324, 12-120, 12-121, and

Rule 54(l}) of the 1dal1o Rules of C~vil Procedure.
XXXI

WI-mltBFOREt the Defendant prays forJudgtttent as follows;
l.

'that.Plain:tilis Complaint to Quiet Title be dismi$ed;:

2.

That Plaintiffs be estopped from claunfug the property was not sold to

Defendant, or in the altemative, be ordered to reimburse Defendfmt twenty thousand
dollars ($20;0.00.00);
.,
.

3.

'fiiat,lhe l>laintiffs be ordered to specifically perfonn the written contract

and/or oral contract;
4.

Plaintiffs, and all persons claiming under them, be required to set forth the

nature. of their claims to the described real property;

000205

•

...

••

,·~, ,,,,,.,..,,
. ·,

i

. \.,_./

5.

All adverse .claims to such teal pmperty be detel'lllinei by a decree of this

6.

The decree adjudge thatDfl'fendant.owns in fee ,simple, and is entitled to the

Court·
.
. f

qul:e.t and peaceful possession of, such real property, and tluit Ptw.ntiffs., and all persens

..

-

-·

'

ehuming under them, have 110 estate, right, title. Hen~ or intmst in or to the real property or
a.tlV p.
art of. i..,
.t•
._,,..

7. ·

The decree pem;ianently enjoin ea.oh Plaintiff', and .al1 persons clEdming

urider them, from asserting any adverse claim tQ Defendant's property;
8.

For costs and disbursements, incluclingreasonable attorney fees in the

amount .ofS-150;00 per hour; and
9;

That th~· court grant such other an4 further relief to ·the D~chUtt . as it shall

deem proper.
llATEI):thm ·9.-1

dayofMay, 20Q1.

AliJSWER AND CC>tJN'r'ERCLAIM -9
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STATE OP IDAHO,

)
)ss;

COUNTY OF ELMORE,

)

Bemardin0 Batraza; being first duly swoI11; d.eposes ,~d :SaY'.S that.he'·is one.ofthe
Defendants named iit th~ foregoing Answer Ellld Cotmtetclaiin, that he has read.said

Answer and.Coun:t~cllUlll~ lcnows the contents thereof:and believes the facts therein statecl
to be. true;

~Un~~~: nt$k~
D~ftndiint .... ·. ~
SUBSCRJRED AND $~ORN to before me
day ofMay., 2-007~
.

t,hi.Jif

CBRTW:IG~~rtRYI'~
I l:lEREB.Y CElltlFY that .upon tbe~iy ·olMay, 2007, I ca~ to be served

a true anclc«reef.~y,ofAnsw~ and C~un,te~l1).i_l,D by1b~~·im:UO@.to.d,\Jelow,

addressed to: @~foll~wint:

_Lu,S.Mrul

MARK D. PERISON, PA..

. ··

3149 S. 9TH STREET
.
, SUITE JOO
P.O. Box 6575
BOISE, IO 83707·65?5
(208) 33 l--120'()
(2-08-) 343-5838 FAX
.

.

.

·
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. 6v~might Mail
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EXHIBIT "F"
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QUITCLAIM DEED

FOR VALUE RECEIVED: Thirty Five Thousmid dollars ($35,000.00)

. JUAN M CUEVAS AND YRENE BAEZ . .
Whose address is: 501' WEDGE MONT AVE PHOENIX, AZ 85035
Hereinafter called the first party. do hefebY convey, release, remise and forever
QUITCLAIM unto second party: WILFRIDO CUEVAS
The following described premises to--wit:

~

N

c::::,Cl

C-

c:=

z

r-.,

Parcelno.06n0Sw198800
196N-5WSB

0

,,

TAX 2-B 1N SWSE.

::3

.....
N

SEIi". ,A7TAC.HED

c.n

Dated: 06/13/2007

0

:::0

-:a

!

c:,

..c

·c:r

m

~

Q

co

..

-:a
...

Juan M Cuevas

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The said first party has signed and sealed these presents the·
day IU;ld year first above ~tten. .

SfJlte ofli>AHO )
:ss

On this 13th day of June, 2007 before me, Jesus Lobo, a Notary Public in and for the
State ofidaho, personally appeare~ Juan M Cuevas and Yrene Baez known to me to be the
persons whose names are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that they
executed the same.
·
WITNESS my hand and official seaL
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A ~art of the Southwest 14 of the 5outhe~st li, Section
19, .Township 6 North, Range 5 West~of the 0 oise Meridian,
more p-lrticularly described to-wit:

Commencing at the So~thwest corner of the Southwest ~-of
the Soutl':.east ~. Section 19,township 6 North, kange 5
.:est of the Boise Meridian, the Ini tia.l Point of this description; thence .North 0°01' East 924 feet, along the ·
,-:est line of· the Said Southwest ¼oivthe Southeast\l thence
South 55•15 • E.ast 336.82 feet; thence South 0°07' ::est
730 feet, parallel, to the said West line to a;:•point on
the Sout.~ line of t.~e iaid Southwest ~of the Southeast¼;
thence South 89°35' ,.rest ~77.15 feet, along the said South

line to the Initial ?oint of t~is description.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 34421
JUAN MANUEL CUEVAS and YRENE
BAEZ, individuals,

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs-Respondents,

v.

)

2008 Opinion No. 60
Filed: June 24, 2008
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

)
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual, )
)
Defendant-Appellant,
)
)
and
)
)
LIOBALDO GARZA, an individual, and
)
DOES I through X, unknown claimants to the)
real property described in Exhibit "A",
)
commonly known as 29452 Pear Road,
)
Parma, Idaho,
)
)
Defendants.
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Canyon County. Hon. Dennis E. Goff, District Judge.
Order denying motion to set aside default judgment, reversed and ~ remanded.
Robert W. Ward of Hall, Friedly & Ward, Mountain Home, for appellant.
Mark D. Perison, Boise, for respondents.
PERRY, Judge
Bernardino Barraza appeals from the district court's order denying his motion to set aside
a default judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the order, vacate the default
judgment, and remand to the district court.

I
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I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE
In March 2001, Juan Manuel Cuevas and Yrene Baez (hereinafter referred to as
"Cuevas") allegedly entered into an agreement with Bernardino Barraza and Liobaldo Garza
regarding real property (hereinafter "the ranch") owned by Cuevas. On May 6, 2002, Barraza
recorded a form legal document titled "Claim of Lien," which was signed by Garza and himself
on April 1, 2002. As filled in, the lien asserted that Cuevas contracted Barraza and Garza to
furnish "labor, service or materials consisting of unpaid refund in the amount $20,000.00 for the
payments on real estate title on" the ranch. (Filled-in portions of form in italics). The lien also

asserted that the $20,000 remained unpaid and the "lienor furnished the first of the items on the
fifth day of January, 2002," and the "last of the items on the fifth day of January, 2002." The

lien also stated that "lienor" had provided the "contractor" with notice of the lien on March 7,
2002.
On April 2, 2007, Cuevas filed a complaint seeking to quiet title to the ranch and seeking
damages for slander of title. Barraza received service of the complaint on April 15, 2007. 1
Barraza having filed no answer, Cuevas filed a motion for default judgment and supporting
affidavits on May 9, 2007. On May 15, 2007, the district court entered an order of default
judgment.
On May 24, 2007, Barraza filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 60(b), with an affidavit of counsel for Barraza and a proposed answer to the complaint
and counterclaim. 2

The answer and counterclaim alleged that Cuevas executed a written

contract to sell the ranch to Barraza on March 6, 2001, for $80,000, and Barraza paid
$22,635.76, as a down payment. Barraza attached as an exhibit the purported contract, which
consists of two pages, one of which is written in Spanish. Barraza further alleged that Cuevas
later orally promised to reimburse Barraza $20,000 upon re-sale of the ranch to another party if

Although counsel also averred in the affidavit that he filed the original affidavits of
service on Garza and Barraza with the motion for default judgment, those documents are not
included in the record before us.
2

The record indicates that counsel for Barraza also represented Garza in this matter prior
to when Cuevas filed the complaint. Garza was not a party to Barraza's answer, however, and is
not a party to this appeal.

2
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Barraza would vacate the premises. Barraza pled that he vacated the property and Cuevas had
not reimbursed the $20,000. Barraza's answer also alleged affirmative defenses that Barraza was
the owner of the ranch, Cuevas should be equitably estopped from denying he sold the ranch to
Barraza, and the statute of limitation barred Cuevas' claims.

The answer also included

counterclaims of breach of a written contract, breach of an oral contract, breach of an implied infact contract, unjust enrichment, equitable estoppel, and a claim to quiet title to the ranch in
Barraza. In the affidavit, Barraza's counsel averred that Barraza had previously retained him as
counsel with regard to the dispute over this land several months before the complaint was filed
but did not contact him promptly when served with the complaint. According to counsel's
affidavit, Barraza believed that he did not need to contact counsel due to counsel's prior
representation. Counsel further averred that Barraza spoke very little English and thus could not
understand the summons requiring a responsive pleading in twenty days.
Cuevas filed a brief in opposition to the motion with a supporting affidavit and evidence
of correspondence between his counsel and counsel for Barraza. The first letter, faxed from
counsel for Cuevas to counsel for Barraza on March 19, 2007, requested that Barraza and Garza
release the lien and indicated that, if they failed to do so, Cuevas would file a complaint to quiet
title after March 23, 2007. The letter also included a copy of the complaint to be filed and
indicated that, if counsel was still representing Barraza and Garza, he should contact them to
make them aware of the impending litigation. In the second letter, faxed from counsel for
Cuevas to counsel for Barraza on May 21, 2007, counsel indicated that he had received a phone
message from Barraza's counsel stating that Barraza had "surfaced" and wished to defend
against the action. Cuevas asserted in the brief that Barraza had not established excusable
neglect with the affidavit of his counsel and that Barraza did not have a meritorious defense
against the quiet title action.
At a hearing, the district court ruled that Barraza had not established a mistake or
excusable neglect because Rule 60(b) does not mention a language barrier or lack of knowledge
of the legal system as bases to set aside a default judgment. The district court stated that a
reasonable person who received a summons in a foreign language "would have contacted a
lawyer if they were familiar with the lawyer to advise them." The district court also ruled that
Barraza had not pled facts that would establish a meritorious defense to the quiet title action

3
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because Barraza had not set forth facts that Barraza had a valid lien on the ranch. Regarding the
effect of the lien, the district court stated:
Even if I said there was a land sale agreement for this particular piece of
property, which I would have to assume that's what the Spanish document says .
and that's referring to this piece of property, the lien says we're not claiming any
ownership of that property any longer. All we're claiming is that when he sold it
he was going to give us $20,000.
The district court reasoned that, although Barraza may have alleged facts that would establish a
meritorious claim for $20,000 in monetary damages, the default judgment only affected the
validity of the lien and did not preclude any future action for monetary damages. Because the
statute of limitation had run with regard to any claims based on the lien, the district court
concluded that Barraza did not have a meritorious defense against the quiet title action. The
district court subsequently entered an order denying Barraza's motion to set aside the default
judgment. Barraza appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

A default judgment may be set aside where it resulted from, inter alia, excusable neglect
or mistake of fact. I.R.C.P. 60(b). A trial court's refusal to set aside a default judgment is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.

Idaho State Police, ex. rel. Russell v. Real

Property Situated in County of Cassia, 144 Idaho 60, 62, 156 P.3d 561, 563 (2007). On review
of the trial court's application of law to the facts found on a motion to set aside a default
judgment upon the grounds set forth in Rule 60(b)(1 }, the reviewing court will consider whether
appropriate criteria were applied and whether the result is one that logically follows. Tyler v.

Keeney, 128 Idaho 524, 526, 915 P.2d 1382, 1384 (Ct. App. 1996). Thus, if: (a) the trial court
makes findings of fact which are not clearly erroneous; (b) the court applies to those facts the
proper criteria under Rule 60(b)(l) (tempered by the policy favoring relief in doubtful cases);
and (c) the trial court's decision follows logically from the application of such criteria to the facts
found, then the trial court will be deemed to have acted within its sound discretion, and its
decision will not be overturned on appeal. Id

4
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m.
ANALYSIS

A.

Mistake of Fact or Excusable Neglect
Barraza asserts that the district court erred in ruling that he had not established that his

failure to timely file an answer to the complaint was due to a mistake or excusable neglect.
Cuevas asserts that Barraza did not present any admissible evidence establishing excusable
neglect because Barraza relied entirely on the inadmissible hearsay statements contained in his
counsel's affidavit.

Cuevas also asserts that the inability to speak or read English is not a

sufficient basis to establish mistake or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(l).
We first address Cuevas' assertion that Barraza presented no admissible evidence
supporting his assertion of mistake or excusable neglect.

Barraza presented only the

inadmissible hearsay statements contained in an affidavit by Barraza's counsel as to Barraza's
mistake. See I.RE. 801, 802. Cuevas, however, did not object to the admissibility of the
affidavit at the hearing on the motion to set aside default. When ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, a trial court may consider an affidavit containing statements that fail to comply with
the admissibility requirements of I.R.C.P. 56(e) in the absence of a timely objection and motion
to strike. 3 See State, Dept. of Agric. v. Curry Bean Co. Inc., 139 Idaho 789, 792, 86 P.3d 503,
506 (2004); Tolmie Farms, Inc. v. J.R. Simplot Co., Inc., 124 Idaho 607, 610, 862 P.2d 299, 302
(1993); Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878, 881, 693 P.2d 1080, 1083 (Ct. App. 1984). The same
rule should apply to the failure to properly object to the admissibility of statements contained in
an affidavit submitted to establish excusable neglect to set aside a default judgment. Although
Cuevas asserted in the brief in opposition to the motion to set aside default that the affidavit was
hearsay, he did not move to strike nor object to its consideration by the district court.

Rather

than object, counsel for Cuevas provided little argument in opposition to Barraza's theory of
mistake or excusable neglect. Indeed, counsel stated "I think if the meritorious defense issue
weren't here in front of us, I wouldn't be here. I would have stipulated to set aside the default
because I understand how liberal that standard is in terms of mistake."

3

Pursuant to Rule 56(e), supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
5
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The district court expressly rejected Barraza's assertion that a language barrier could
cause mistake or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) and, thus, considered the affidavit as
evidence. Because the district court considered the affidavit as evidence at the hearing, we will
also consider it in the absence of an adequate objection below.
Barraza asserts that the affidavit provided a sufficient factual basis for a mistake or
excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)( 1). The affidavit provided, in part:
4.
Defendant believed that I was representing him after our
discussions regarding the case, and therefore had the mistaken belief that he did
not need to let me know that a lawsuit had been filed and a lady had given him
papers as service of process.
5.
Defendant speaks very little English, cannot read or write English,
and thus did not understand the notice in the Summons requiring him to file a
responsive pleading within twenty (20) days.
The record indicates that Barraza received service of the summons and complaint on April 15,
2007. Rule 12(a) required Barraza to file his responsive pleading within twenty days--by May 5,
2007. The district court entered default judgment on May 15, 2007, and the record indicates that
Barraza filed his motion to set aside default, with a responsive pleading attached, on May 24,
2007. Thus, even if we assume that Barraza received service of the default judgment on the date
it was entered, he filed his motion to set aside the default judgment within nine days.
Barraza asserts that the affidavit demonstrated mistake or excusable neglect due to his
communication barrier, his poor knowledge of the legal system, his mistaken belief that counsel
was representing him in this matter at the time he received the summons, and his diligence in
moving to set aside the default judgment. A mistake sufficient to warrant setting aside a default
judgment must be of fact and not of law. Idaho State Police, 144 Idaho at 62, 156 P.3d at 563.
Neglect must be excusable and, to be of that calibre, must be conduct that might be expected of a
reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances. Id Reasonable diligence in the effort
to set aside the default judgment is a requirement in demonstrating reasonably prudent conduct.

See Baldwin v. Baldwin, 114 Idaho 525, 528, 757 P.2d 1244, 1247 (Ct. App. 1988); Clark v.

Atwood, 112 Idaho 115, 117, 730 P .2d 1035, 1037 (Ct. App. 1986).
In several cases with lengthier delays than that caused by Barraza, Idaho appellate courts
have held that relief should be granted from default judgment. See, e.g., Johnson v. Oxborrow,
141 Idaho 635, 639, 115 P.3d 726, 730 (2005); Kovachy v. DeLeusomme, 122 Idaho 973, 975,

6
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842 P.2d 309, 311 (Ct. App. 1992); Baldwin, 114 Idaho at 527, 757 P.2d at 1246; Johnson v.
Pioneer Title Co. of Ada County, 104 Idaho 727,733,662 P.2d 1171, 1177 (Ct. App. 1983).

These cases demonstrate that in doubtful cases a standard of liberality rather than strictness must
be applied. See Idaho State Police, 144 Idaho at 62, 156 P.3d at 563. The district court erred in
not applying the standard of liberality to this case.
The district court also erred to the extent that it ruled a language barrier cannot be
considered in evaluating mistake or excusable neglect. See Straub v. Straub, 80 Idaho 221,225,
327 P.2d 358, 360 (1958). In Straub, the Supreme Court considered a party's inability to speak
the English language as a factor in support of its holding that the district court erred in denying a
motion to set aside a default judgment. 4 Id.
Furthermore, the district court does not appear to have considered Barraza's factual
assertion that he believed that counsel was representing him in this matter at the time he received
the summons, and diligence in moving to set aside the default judgment. Cuevas's attorney
asserts that he mailed a copy of the complaint to counsel for Barraza prior to filing the complaint,
but this assertion fails to establish that counsel for Barraza knew the date the complaint would be
filed or that Barraza wished to employ counsel's services in contesting the complaint. The
affidavit of counsel for Barraza indicates that Barraza had the mistaken belief that counsel was
representing him based upon counsel's prior representation of him in this matter. Although the
district court was correct that a mistake of law or a mistake regarding the legal system is not
grounds for relief from default judgment, Barraza has established that he made a factual mistake
regarding his relationship with his attorney.
The affidavit considered by the district court indicates that Barraza' s delay was due to his
misunderstanding of the English language and his mistaken belief that counsel was representing
him. Barraza diligently moved to set aside the default judgment nine days after it was entered.
Based on the record before us, we cannot say that Barraza was guilty of indifference or
deliberate delay in failing to timely answer the complaint. The district court abused its discretion

4

Straub applied the default judgment standard contained in the repealed LC. § 5-905.
Similar to Rule 60(b)(l), that former section also allowed a trial court to set aside a default
judgment for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. See 1921 Idaho Sess. Laws,
ch. 235. The Idaho Supreme Court has also recently relied on its opinions interpreting the
former LC. § 5-905, for guidance in applying Rule 60(b)(l). See Johnson, 141 Idaho at 639, 115
P.3d at 730.

7
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by applying the incorrect legal standards and failing to adequately consider Barraza's factual
assertions. Applying the proper standards, the district court should have concluded that Barraza
demonstrated mistake or excusable neglect.

B.

Meritorious Defense
When moving to set aside a default judgment, the moving party must not only meet the

requirements of LR. C.P. 60(b) but must also plead facts which, if established, would constitute a
defense to the action. Idaho State Police, 144 Idaho at 62, 156 P.3d at 563. It would be an idle
exercise for the court to set aside a default if there is in fact no real justiciable controversy. Id.
The defense matters must be detailed.

Once a default has been entered the pleading of a

defensive matter must go beyond the mere notice requirements that would be sufficient if pied
before default. Id. at 63, 156 P.3d at 564. Factual details must be pied with particularity. Id
Barraza asserts that the district court erred in ruling that he failed to plead facts which, if
proven to be true, would entitle him to an interest in the ranch. The district court found that "the
lien says we're not claiming any ownership of that property any longer." The district court thus
ruled that Barraza's claims regarding the prior written agreement did not establish a meritorious
defense. The lien referred to in the district court's ruling was attached to Cuevas' complaint and
appears to have been a form document for a mechanics lien. 5 Barraza apparently attempted to
fill out the document such that it asserted a claim against the property for "the unpaid refund in
the amount of $20,000 for the payments on real estate title." Cuevas' complaint alleged that, if
the lien was a mechanics lien, the statute of limitation to file a foreclosure action on the lien had
passed pursuant to LC. § 45-510. The complaint further alleged that, if the lien was based upon a
breach of contract action, the time to file such an action, pursuant to I.C. §§ 5-216, 5-217, had
expired by the passage of five years since the time when Barraza was aware of such a claim. The
complaint sought to have the lien released from the property, to have title quieted against all
other claimants, and to have damages awarded for slander of title. The default judgment quieted
title in Cuevas as against the claim asserted in the lien and stated that Barraza and Garza "shall
have no further right, title or interest in and to the real property."

5

A mechanics lien is a "statutory lien that secures payment for labor or materials supplied
in improving, repairing, or maintaining real or personal property."
BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, 943 (8th ed. 2004). See also I.C. §§ 45-501 to 45-525.
8
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To establish a meritorious defense, Barraza had to allege at least one claim demonstrating
that he had an interest in the ranch such that title should not be quieted in Cuevas. In the
responsive pleading, Barraza did not claim any interest under the lien nor even refer to it; rather,
he alleged that Cuevas entered into a written contract to sell the ranch to Barraza for $80,000 on
March 6, 2001, and that Barraza paid $22,635.76, as a down payment. Barraza claimed that
Cuevas breached the written contract for sale of the ranch by filing the instant quiet title action.
Pursuant to LC. § 5-216, an action upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an
instrument in writing must be filed within five years. A cause of action for breach of contract
accrues upon breach for limitations purposes. See Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 830, 11
P.3d 20, 26 (2000); Skaggs v. Jensen, 94 Idaho 179,180,484 P.2d 728, 729 (1971). The fiveyear statute of limitation for Barraza to bring this breach of contract claim began to run when
Barraza became aware of the breach. The breach alleged in Barraza' s answer occurred when
Cuevas filed the instant quiet title action--April 2, 2007. Barraza filed his answer asserting the
breach of contract claim less than two months later. If an enforceable contract can be proven,
this claim would constitute a meritorious defense to the quiet title action because it would
establish that Barraza has an ownership right in the ranch. If Barraza can prove his allegations
that he contracted to buy the ranch, he would be entitled to specific performance on the contract.
See P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 238, 159 P.3d 870,

875 (2007).
The district court's finding that the lien disclaimed any right Barraza had in the property
was clearly erroneous. Nothing in the language of the lien disclaimed any right to the property
that may have existed at the time Barraza recorded the lien. By filing the lien, Barraza appears to
have attempted to give notice of his interest in the property in the event that Cuevas failed to
return Barraza's down payment upon sale of the land to a third party. Barraza did not assert
below and does not assert now that the lien was ever enforceable.

The expiration of the

limitation period to bring an action attempting to enforce the lien under the mechanic's lien
statutes, I.C. §§ 45-501 to 45-525, did not extinguish any property right created by a written
contract for the sale of the ranch. Cuevas asserts that Barraza's actions of vacating the ranch and
filing the lien establish that he knew Cuevas did not intend to sell Barraza the property and,
therefore, the breach of contract claim accrued when he signed the lien--April 1, 2002. If
Barraza's allegations are true, however, Barraza purchased the ranch pursuant to a written

9
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contract and only filed the lien in order to protect his right to the money he had paid while he
believed Cuevas was attempting to sell the ranch to a third party. Under that factual scenario, the
breach did not occur until Cuevas filed the instant quiet title action.
Cuevas also argues that the documents attached to Barraza's answer, which purportedly
constitute a contract for sale of the ranch to Barraza, demonstrate that the alleged contract does
not satisfy the statute of frauds, LC.§ 9-505(4). However, Barraza alleged facts which could be
sufficient to take the contract out of the statute of frauds by application of the doctrine of part
performance or equitable estoppel. See Chappin v. Linden, 144 Idaho 393, 396-97, 162 P.3d
772, 775-76 (2007); Frantz v. Parke, 111 Idaho 1005, 1008-11, 729 P.2d 1068, 1071-74 (Ct.
App. 1986).
Furthermore, Cuevas is incorrect that Barraza was required to prove the terms of the
written contract.

To establish a meritorious defense, a party moving to set aside a default

judgment is not required to present evidence in order to have the default judgment set aside.

Idaho State Police, 144 Idaho at 63, 156 P.3d at 564. The meritorious defense requirement is a
pleading requirement, not a burden of proof. Id. Barraza was not required to submit the written
contract into evidence or provide a translation of the portion of the contract written in Spanish.
Barraza was required to plead a meritorious defense with particularity. See id. Barraza pied that
there was a written contract for the sale of the land and indicated the date of the contract, the
parties, the real property involved, and the amounts of the down payment and full sale price.
Barraza asserted that Cuevas breached the contract by filing the instant quiet title action.
Assuming these facts to be true, Barraza has established a meritorious defense because Cuevas
breached the contract.
Although Barraza does not assert that the lien was valid or enforceable, he pled a
meritorious breach of written contract claim sufficient to warrant setting aside the default
judgment. We need not address the other allegations contained in Barraza's responsive pleading
because we have concluded that Barraza asserted one meritorious defense to the quiet title
action. After the default is set aside, Barraza's additional affirmative defenses and counterclaims
will more properly be addressed by the district court in the first instance.

C.

Attorney Fees
Both parties request attorney fees on appeal pursuant to LC. §§ 12-120, 12-121, and

I.AR. 41. Both parties, however, failed to provide argument in support of their requests for

10
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attorney fees. A party must provide argument in support of a request for attorney fees on appeal.

See Weaver v. Searle Bros., 131 Idaho 610, 616, 962 P.2d 381, 387 (1998). See also I.A.R.
35(a)(6). We therefore decline to address both requests for attorney fees.

IV.
CONCLUSION

The district court abused its discretion in ruling that Barraza failed to demonstrate
mistake or excusable neglect. The district court also abused its discretion in ruling that Barraza
had not pied a meritorious defense to Cuevas' quiet title action. We therefore reverse the district
court's order denying the motion to set aside, vacate the default judgment, and remand to the
district court for further proceedings. Costs, but not attorney fees, are awarded to Barraza.
Chief Judge GUTIERREZ, CONCURS.
Judge LANSING, DISSENTING
Although I agree with the majority that Barraza has adequately alleged a meritorious
defense, I would affirm the district court's holding that he failed to show that his default was the
product of excusable neglect.
A motion to set aside a default judgment under this rule is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court, and we therefore will not disturb the trial court's order in the absence
of an abuse of discretion. Clear Springs Trout Co. v. Anthony, 123 Idaho 141, 143, 845 P.2d
559, 561 (1992); Tyler v. Keeney, 128 Idaho 524, 526, 915 P.2d 1382, 1384 (Ct. App. 1996).
Excusable neglect is "a factual question ... which 'must be answered by examining what might
be expected of a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances."' State, Dep 't of Law

Enforcement v. One 1990 Geo Metro, 126 Idaho 675, 680, 889 P.2d 109, 114 (Ct. App. 1995)
(quoting Herzinger v. Lockwood Corp., 109 Idaho 18, 19, 704 P.2d 350, 351 (Ct. App. 1985)).
Thus, on appeal we examine the district court's determination as to whether the litigant "engaged
in conduct which, although constituting neglect, was nevertheless excusable because a
reasonably prudent person might have done the same thing under the circumstances."

&hraufnagel v. Quinowski, 113 Idaho 753, 754, 747 P.2d 775, 776 (Ct. App. 1987).
Here, the only evidence purporting to explain Barraza' s inaction after service of the
complaint was presented through the affidavit of his attorney, which states:
2. That Defendant discussed this case with me, and paid me for my legal
advice; however, at that time, no lawsuit was filed and therefore I could not file a
Notice of Appearance on behalf of Defendant.
11
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3. A Complaint was later filed and Defendant was served with the
Complaint, but did not tell me, thus, no Answer and Counterclaim was filed.
4. Defendant believed that I was representing him after our discussions
regarding the case, and therefore had the mistaken belief that he did not need to
let me know that a lawsuit had been filed and a lady had given him papers as
service of process.
5. Defendant speaks very little English, cannot read or write English, and
thus did not understand the notice in the Summons requiring him to file a
responsive pleading within twenty (20) days.
From this affidavit we are informed that at some unidentified time prior to
commencement of the action, Barraza talked to his lawyer about the dispute but did not contact
the lawyer after Barraza was served with process. We are told he believed that he did not need to
notify the lawyer about service of the complaint, but we are given no basis upon which he could
have formed such a mistaken belief. We are also informed that because of a language barrier, he
did not understand the notification in the summons requiring a responsive pleading within twenty
days, and from that we can infer that he did not ask anyone to translate the document for him.
In my view, the district court was well within the bounds of its discretion in finding that
these facts do not describe conduct "which would be expected of a reasonably prudent person
under the same circumstances." I am not unsympathetic with the difficulties confronted by a
non-English-speaking person who is thrust into the complexities of the American legal system,
but a language barrier, standing alone, cannot justify ignoring service of process. Reasonable
diligence in that circumstance would require that an individual at least obtain the services of an
interpreter who could explain the content of the document. Although Barraza might have had a
legitimate reason to expect that his attorney would protect his interests without notification from
Barraza when process was served, the evidence presented in support of the motion to set aside
the default judgment discloses no reason, much less a reasonable one, for such a belief. A recent
decision of the Idaho Supreme Court indicates that if a defendant who was served with a
complaint retains a lawyer to represent him in the action and the lawyer fails to do so, excusable
neglect is shown, Idaho State Police ex rel. Russell v. Real Property Situated in the County of

Cassia, 144 Idaho 60, 156 P.3d 561 (2007). 1 That is not what occurred here, however, for the
evidence indicates Barraza did not ask the attorney to do anything after the complaint was filed.

This Idaho Supreme Court decision appears to implicitly overrule an Idaho Court of
Appeals decision, Rosales v. Balbas, 125 Idaho 848, 851, 875 P.2d 945, 948 (Ct. App. 1994),
12
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.

For these reasons, I would affirm the district court's denial of Barraza's motion to set
aside the default judgment.

where we stated that ''the neglect of an attorney is attributed to the client; unless the attorney's
neglect is legally excusable, the client will not be excused."
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E DP.M.

JAN 15 2009
Mark D. Perison, Bar No. 4804
MARK D. PERISON, P.A.
314 S. 9th Street, Suite 300
P. 0. Box 6575
Boise, Idaho 83707-6575
Telephone: (208) 331-1200
Fax:
(208) 343-5838

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
KL- DEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
JUAN MANUEL CUEVAS and
YRENE BAEZ, individuals

)
)
)

Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV07-3536

)
)

)
)

vs.

)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY
OF RECORD

)
)

BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an
individual, LIOBALDO GARZA,
an individual, and DOES I
through X, unknown claimants to
the real property described in
Exhibit "A" hereto, commonly
known as 29452 Pearl Road,
Parma, Idaho,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendants.

)
)

Based upon the Request of attorney Mark D. Perison, and the firm of
Mark D. Perison, P.A., to withdraw as attorneys of record for Plaintiffs Juan
Cuevas and Yrene Baez, and for good cause shown,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD - Page I

000227

IT IS THE ORDER OF THE COURT, that:
1.

Mark D. Perlson and Mark D. Perison, P.A., attorneys of record

for Plaintiffs Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez, are entitled to withdraw as
Plaintiffs' attorneys, subject to each of the following conditions/requirements:
2.

Plaintiffs shall appoint another attorney to represent them in this

matter or they shall appear in person, and they shall make this election within
twenty (20) days of the date upon which withdrawing attorney has filed proof
of service of this Order upon Plaintiffs Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez; and,
3.

Withdrawing attorney shall serve a copy of this Order upon the

Plaintiffs and serve a copy of this Order upon Plaintiffs Juan Cuevas and Yrene
Baez by certified mail, return receipt requested; and,
4.

Withdrawing attorney shall continue to represent Plaintiffs Juan

Cuevas and Yrene Baez until proof of service of this Order has been made
upon Plaintiffs Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez; and,
5.

Upon the entry of this Order and the filing of proof of service of

this Order upon Plaintiffs Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez, no further proceedings
can be had in the action which will affect Plaintiffs Juan Cuevas and Yrene
Baez for a period of twenty (20) days; and if the Plaintiffs Juan Cuevas and
Yrene Baez fail to provide Notice of their intent to appear with substitute
counsel or in person within such twenty (20) day period, such failure will be

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD- Page 2
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sufficient grounds for the entry of a default against Plaintiffs Juan Cuevas and
Yrene Baez without further notice.

DATED this __J.5:._ day of January, 2009.

THOMAS J RYAN
Thomas J. Ryan
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ...is=... day of January 9, 2009, I caused
a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served by the method indicated
below and addressed to each of the following:
Mark D. Perison
Mark D. Perlson, P.A.
P.O. Box 6575
Boise, ID 83707

[ ] U.S. Mail
[v'] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile

Robert Ward
Hall, Friedly & Ward
340 East 2 nd North
Mountain Home, ID 83647

[v'] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Facsimile

Juan Cuevas
Yrene Baez
5019 W. Edgemont Ave.
Phoenix, AZ 85035

[v']
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

WILLIAM H HURST

KCANNON
Clerk

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD - Page 3
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ROBERT WARD
RECORDED.
HALL. FRIEDLY & WARD
. .
F I L E
Att-0rneya for ~ferukmt B4rrtardino fS'l'fflH -2 ~ Rm l O _---A.M, \ of~
11
340 East2ridNotth ~
n
M()W!fllin Romo, Idaho i:3647
MAR 7 2009
Telep~ne: (208) 511-4412
F ~ : {:l0~.537~-tU44
RY .
Idaho Stato BarNumber 4442

D

r

\aU!Wtt-~S-"7...,.--~ JN IBE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE tHJltD .JUl)IQLM, DISTRICT OF mE
STATE OF JDAHOt IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAN:YON

JUAN MANUSL CUBVM and YRENE
SABZ, individuals,

Case No. CV-07-3536

JtJDMBNT AND DHCREB
QonmN01lll,E
vs.

_,I
I

I
I

_i
-1
I

I

l
I
I

The above-entitled ~use came on regularly before the Court in CaldwellJ.County
ofCmiyo~ State of!d~ on the ) \a day of "1[v\~ 2009. The Plaintiff's, Juan
Manuel Cuevas.and Ytene Baez, having been duly and regularly served with the Order
Granting Motion te Withdraw as Attorney of Record. The Plaintiffs. Juan Manuel

Cuevas and Yren:e ~aez, having failed to file and serve an additional written: appearance
within twenty (20) days of servfoe of the Otd(U' Granting- Motion to Withdraw as Attorney

of Record, either in petSOD. by attorney or otherwise, pursuant.to the Ortier Granting

Met.ion to Withdntw as Attorney of Record.

00023:1
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the Court bas reviewed the record and·file in thiS: ac~n and the Answer and

Counterclaim-of Defendant,.Bern:ardino B ~-~
. d·
wC -..i.l
LQU property· --~
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-o:wne:sbip and possession ·of
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· . .run
· .· h-~o·· AND
' - . n·E· :c·nnt.o··.,
IT Is·..~J . C:rn;~unn·u
W ~ V ~-~ ~ ' ..·
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quiet and p ~ po~sessi(m of the parcel ofland ·eonurtonly known as 29452 Pearl
R-0~ Parma, ldah~ situated in tlre Co.un.ty ofCanyon, State ofldaho, and described in
~ -~,_;;: L.·l.,.: ~_•A._<.-!J Aftco~l!ed····.h· ·=,.. _ .;;...,.j· b··y:···,_+&-P..-..,,,._
.,,.· ) ..,._
,,..· nv,,-_
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again~ iJilefa:iq;<>t denumds ofthe Plamtiffs,,Juan.MM.uel Cuevas and Yi:ene B~ in all
orlllif part of ~drcal 'J:>'I:OJ)erty,

DATEDthis_'\\o_
. dayof_\""-_
·__-_~_
-_ .· _ ______,2008.
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OCT 27 2009
CANYON COUNTY CLEAi<
T EARLS, DEPUTY

Rebecca A. Rainey, ISB No. 7525
MOFFATT, THOMAS,BARRETT,ROCK&
FIELDS, CHARTERED

101 South Capitol Boulevard, 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
rar@moffatt.com
24163.0000
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

WILFRIDO CUEVAS,
Case No. CV09-8175
Plaintiff,
vs.
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any); LIOBALDO GARZA, an
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN
EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY Ki~OWN AS
29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO,

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT BARRAZA'S
OBJECTION AND MOTION TO
STRIKE

Defendants.

COMES NOW Wilfrido Cuevas, by and through undersigned counsel of record,
and hereby files this opposition to defendant Bernardino Barraza's objection and motion to strike
the affidavit ofWilfrido Cuevas filed in support of motion for summary judgment.

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT BARRAZA'S
OBJECTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE - 1
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Client:1411389.1

Defendant Bernardino Barraza's objection to and motion to strike the affidavit of
Wilfrido Cuevas is based on a misinterpretation of the statute of frauds as it relates to transfers of
interests in land. Idaho Code Section 9-503 provides only that a writing is required for the
transfer of an estate or interest in real property. In this matter, such writing exists as the
quitclaim deed recorded as instrument number 2007043067 recorded in Canyon County on
June 20, 2007, transferred Juan Cuevas' interest in the property to Wilfrido Cuevas. The
evidence that defendant seeks to strike pursuant to his objection and motion to strike is evidence
of the underlying oral contract pursuant to which the property was ultimately transferred. The
statute of frauds does not speak to and does not require the exclusion of evidence of the
circumstances underlying the transfer of property that is evidenced in writing. Because Wilfrido
Cuevas' interest in the property is evidenced by a written, duly recorded quitclaim deed, the
statute of frauds has no application in this matter and does not operate to exclude any of Wilfrido
Cuevas' testimony regarding the underlying transaction. Accordingly, defendant's objection to
the affidavit should be overruled and defendant's motion to strike should be denied.
DATED this 27th day of October, 2009.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

By~~~
Rebecca A. Rainey - OfeF
Attorneys for Plaintiff

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT BARRAZA'S
OBJECTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE - 2
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..
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of October, 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT BARRAZA'S
OBJECTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE to be served by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:
Robert Ward
& WARD
340 East 2nd North
Mountain Home, ID 83647
Facsimile (208) 587-3144
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza
HALL, FRIEDLY

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
()() Facsimile

12----C

Rebecca A. Rainey

PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT BARRAZA'S
OBJECTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE - 3
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OCT 27 2009
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T EARLS, DEPUTY

Rebecca A. Rainey, ISB No. 7525
MOFFATI, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

101 South Capitol Boulevard, 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
rar@moffatt.com
24163.0000
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD ruDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

WILFRIDO CUEVAS,
Case No. CV09-8175
Plaintiff,
vs.
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any); LIOBALDO GARZA, an
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I
THROUGH X, UNKi."-rOWN CLAIMANTS
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN
EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN AS
29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendants.

COMES NOW Wilfiido Cuevas ("W. Cuevas"), by and through undersigned
counsel of record, and hereby files this reply memorandum in support of the pending motion for
summary judgment:

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
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I.

INTRODUCTION

As it currently stands, the default judgment quieting title to the ranch located at
29453 Pearl Road, Parma, Idaho (the "Property"), in Bernardino Barraza's ("Barraza") name is
the result of procedural defects and irregularities that made Barraza the winner of the litigation
lottery. Looking at the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Barraza claims
to have paid approximately $23,000 towards the $80,000 stated purchase price for the purchase
of the Property. Though Barraza never paid the remaining sums due and owing under the
alleged contract for sale, title was quieted in his name. 1 Thus, Barraza claims title to the Property
when, even by his own admissions, he has only paid approximately one-fourth of the stated
purchase price. This is not the type of windfall contemplated by our justice system and, indeed,
demonstrates that something went woefully amiss in the litigation where title was quieted in
defendant Bernardino Barraza's name (see Juan Manuel Cuevas, et al. v. Bernardino Barraza, et

al., Third Judicial District (Canyon County) Case #CV-07-3536, the "Underlying Litigation").
The present lawsuit and pending motion for summary judgment take issue with
the procedural defects and irregularities that occurred the Underlying Litigation. As currently
framed by the pleadings, this Court must decide two relatively simple issues: (1) is the judgment
entered in the Underlying Litigation valid, and (2) if so, does such judgment have a preclusive
effect against W. Cuevas in this action? If this Court answers either of these questions in the
negative, then it must disregard the judgment entered in the Underlying Litigation and address

1

Significantly, the Court of Appeals noted in its decision that the allegations set forth in
Barraza's Counterclaim stated a cause of action entitling him to specific performance of the
contract. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza ("Barraza Aff."), Ex. G at 9.

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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the merits of the pending action, which clearly and conclusively establish that W. Cuevas is the
rightful owner of the Property.
II.

A.

ARGUMENT

The Judgment Entered in the Underlying Litigation is Not Valid.

Due to the procedural defects and irregularities in the Underlying Litigation, there
are at least three separate, independent bases for this Court to determine that the judgment and
order quieting title is not valid: First, the Answer and Counterclaim pursuant to which the
judgment were allegedly entered was not properly served upon Juan Cuevas, plaintiff in the
Underlying Litigation.

Second, the Answer and Counterclaim was not properly filed in the

Underlying Litigation.

Third, the judgment entered in the Underlying Litigation was not

responsive to the pleadings. Each of these three defects is jurisdictional and establishes that the
court had no authority to enter the default judgment. If this Court finds that any one of these
three defects or irregularities occurred, the judgment entered in the Underlying Litigation is void
and of no force or effect.
1.

The Answer and Counterclaim was not properly served on Juan
Cuevas, plaintiff in the Underlying Litigation.

The first independent basis for finding the judgment and order quieting title in the
Underlying Litigation void is that the court did not obtain jurisdiction over Juan Cuevas
regarding the claims asserted in the counterclaim because the counterclaim was never properly
served on Juan Cuevas. Service of process is necessary to obtain personal jurisdiction over a
party against whom a claim is asserted. See Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 646 Idaho 217
(1984). Generally, where a counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff, service of process is not
necessary because service can be made on the plaintiffs attorney in accordance with Idaho Rule

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
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of Civil Procedure 5(a). However, when default is sought for failure of a party to appear, Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a) requires that service of the new or additional claims for relief set
forth in the counterclaim be made in accordance with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4, i.e.,
personal service of summons.
Barraza argues that Juan Cuevas was properly served with the Answer and
Counterclaim in the Underlying Litigation because Juan Cuevas' attorney was served with the
same on May 23, 2007, when it was attached to the affidavit of counsel in support of the motion
to set aside default. The Court of Appeals has expressly noted that this is insufficient to
constitute service: "Service of a motion for leave to file a counterclaim, even with the proposed
counterclaim attached, is not the equivalent of service of the counterclaim itself." Viafax Corp.
v. Stuckenbrock, 124 Idaho 65, 70, 995 P.2d 835, 840 (Ct. App. 2000).
Moreover, at the time of this alleged service, default had been entered against
Barraza in the Underlying Litigation. At such time, Barraza did not have authority to either
serve or file the Answer and Counterclaim: "Filing and service of the counterclaim itself could
be properly accomplished only after permission had been obtained by the court." Viafax Corp. v.
Stuckenbrock, 134 Idaho 65, 995 P.2d 835 (Ct. App. 2000). Barraza has not cited to any legal
authority to dispute this proposition. Barraza cannot, therefore, rely on the service to Juan
Cuevas' attorney that allegedly took place May 23, 2007, because at that time the court had not
granted him permission to file and/or serve the Answer and Counterclaim.
The earliest date that it can be said that Barraza had permission to serve the
Answer and Counterclaim was when Court of Appeals entered its opinion in June 24, 2008,
reversing the district court's denial of Barraza's motion to set aside default. This opinion was
entered more than one year after the alleged service that Barraza relies upon had been made.

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4
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Barraza did not attempt to re-serve the Answer and Counterclaim at any time after June 24, 2008.
Because Barraza did not serve the Answer and Counterclaim after he had permission from a
court to do so, Barraza cannot claim that the Answer and Counterclaim was ever properly served.
As further support for the position that the Answer and Counterclaim was never
served upon Juan Cuevas in the Underlying Litigation, this Court need only consider the
following unanswerable question: If Juan Cuevas was served with the Counterclaim, on what
date was his answer to the same due? Under I.R.C.P. 12(a), "the plaintiff shall serve a reply to a
counterclaim in the answer within twenty (20) days after service of the answer or, if a reply is
ordered by the Court, within twenty (20) days after service of the order .... " (emphasis added).
The fact that this question cannot be answered conclusively establishes that the Answer and
Counterclaim was never served on Juan Cuevas and that the court never entered an order
deeming the Answer and Counterclaim to have been served. 2
Because the Answer and Counterclaim was not served upon Juan Cuevas, the
court did not have jurisdiction to grant the affirmative reliefrequested therein. Accordingly, the
default judgment entered upon such Answer and Counterclaim is void and ofno force and effect.

2.

The Answer and Counterclaim was never filed in the Underlying
Litigation.

The second independent basis for finding the judgment and order entered in the
Underlying Litigation to be invalid is that the Answer and Counterclaim was never filed with the
2

Looking again at the Court of Appeals Order, it is clear that the Court of Appeals
contemplated that the district court would take some further action to formally grant permission
to Barraza to file the Answer and Counterclaim: "After the default is set aside, Barraza's
additional affirmative defenses and counterclaims will be more properly addressed by the district
court in the first instance." Barraza Aff., Ex. G at 10. Significantly, in reviewing the register of
actions, it does not even appear as though the district court took the necessary step of entering an
order to set aside default, as was mandated by the Court of Appeals.
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court. As evidence that the Answer and Counterclaim was never filed with the court, W. Cuevas
has directed this Court's attention to several documents. First, the register of action for the
Underlying Litigation is completely devoid of any indication that the Answer and Counterclaim
was filed. Second, the Answer and Counterclaim itself, which is only in the record as an
attachment to the affidavit of counsel in support of the motion to set aside default, lacks a stamp
indicating a date on which it was filed. The filing stamp appears only on the affidavit of counsel,
the document to which the Answer and Counterclaim is attached. Third, the affidavit of counsel
expressly notes that the Answer and Counterclaim is only a proposed Answer and Counterclaim
and seeks permission to file the attached Answer and Counterclaim. See Memorandum in
Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Appendix C, Affidavit of Counsel in
Support of Motion to Set Aside Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b), ~~ 6 and 7. "Filing and
service of the counterclaim itself could be properly accomplished only after permission had been
obtained by the court." Via/ax Corp. v. Stuckenbrock, 134 Idaho 65, 995 P.2d 835 (Ct App.
2000). Because Barraza was only seeking permission to file the Answer and Counterclaim at the
time he lodged the same with the court, the alleged May 23, 2007, filing does not satisfy Idaho's
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Significantly, there is no order in the Underlying Litigation that purports to deem
the Answer and Counterclaim attached to the affidavit of counsel as filed at any point in that
litigation. Barraza cites to I.R.C.P. 5(e), which provides that a judge may accept pleadings for
filing, which requires that the judge shall then "note thereon the filing date, hour and minute and
forthwith transmit them to the office of the clerk." Barraza then points to the quiet title judgment
in which the court notes that it has "reviewed the record and file in this action and the Answer
and Counterclaim of Defendant, Bernardino Barraza .... " Answering Brief in Opposition to W.
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Cuevas' Motion for Summary Judgment at 7. This recitation does not satisfy the filing
requirements of I.R.C.P. 5(e). Simply put, Barraza has pointed to no evidence indicating that the
Answer and Counterclaim was ever properly filed or that the court entered an order deeming the
same to have been filed. Because the Answer and Counterclaim was never properly filed with
the court in the Underlying Litigation, the court had no jurisdiction to grant relief on the claims
set forth in such pleadings.

3.

The judgment and order entered in the Underlying Litigation was not
responsive to the pleadings.

As the third independent basis for finding that the judgment in the underlying
litigation was invalid, this Court may look to the fact that the order entered was not responsive to
the pleadings. As already noted herein, the default judgment obtained by Barraza in the
Underlying Litigation is the functional equivalent of winning $60,000 in the litigation lottery.
Barraza obtained title to Property which, by his own admissions, he agreed to pay $80,000 for
when he only paid approximately $23,000 toward the purchase price. Assuming, arguendo, that
all facts set forth in the proposed Answer and Counterclaim are true, Barraza failed to plead facts
that would grant him title to the Property without, at the very least, paying the remaining balance
of due and owing towards the purchase price. 3 Because the default judgment and order entered
did not take into account the approximately $60,000 remaining on the purchase price, which
remaining balance was set forth in Barraza's pleadings, it cannot be said that the order entered
was responsive to the pleadings. Accordingly, based on the authority of Martin v. Soden, the
judgment, which granted relief beyond the issues tendered by the pleadings, was entered without
jurisdiction and is, therefore, void. 81 Idaho 274,281, 340, P.2d 848, 852 (1959) ("It is, of

3

See Court of Appeals' comments discussed at footnote 1, infra.
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course, fundamental that a judgment must be responsive, not only to the prayer, but to the issues
tendered by the pleadings.").

B.

The Judgment Entered in the Underlying Litigation Does Not Have
Preclusive Effect Against W. Cuevas.
Even if this Court were to find, despite the numerous procedural defects and

irregularities, that the judgment entered in the Underlying Litigation is valid, this Court may still
address the merits of the present matter because the judgment entered in the Underlying
Litigation does not have a preclusive effect against W. Cuevas. The critical question regarding
whether the judgment entered in the Underlying Litigation is whether W. Cuevas was in privity
with Juan Cuevas for purposes of the previous quiet title judgment. The question of privity turns
on the dual question of when W. Cuevas obtained his interest in the Property and when an action
affecting title to the Property was commenced. While Barraza attempts to limit this inquiry to
when W. Cuevas obtained title to the Property, the focus is not that narrow. The rule, as stated in
Sartain v. Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc., 116 Idaho 269,272, 775 P.2d 161, 164 (1989), requires only
that the third party acquire rights in the property, not actual title to the property. In this case, it is
indisputable that W. Cuevas acquired rights in the Property before the litigation began; the
dispute, to the extent that one exists, is with respect to the nature and extent of rights obtained by
W. Cuevas prior to commencement of the Underlying Litigation. 4 While W. Cuevas maintains
that he had the rights of a vendee to a land sale contract, Barraza's affidavit suggests that W.

4

To the extent there is a disputed issue of fact, such dispute involves the nature of the
rights acquired by W. Cuevas prior to the time the action was commenced. While W. Cuevas
maintains that he had been purchasing the Property from Juan Cuevas under an oral contract
since 2003, Barraza claims that he understood W. Cuevas to be simply leasing the Property from
Juan Cuevas at the time Juan Cuevas commenced the litigation seeking to quiet title to remove
the cloud created by Barr~a' s improper lien.
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Cuevas only had rights of a lessee. At best, these conflicting versions of events create an
genuine issue of fact that would not be appropriately decided on a motion for summary
judgment.
However, the question regarding the preclusive effect of the judgment in the
Underlying Litigation may be resolved, as a matter of law, regardless of this factual dispute
because, regardless of the nature ofW. Cuevas' interest in the Property at the time the Complaint
was filed, he clearly had title to the Property prior to the time the action affecting the Property
had commenced. The rule, as stated in Sartain, is that "if a third party acquires rights to the
property before receiving actual notice that an action affecting title to property has been filed ...
the third party is not bound by the subsequent judgment." Id. This raises the question of when
the "action affecting title to property" in the Underlying Litigation was filed. Barraza maintains
that the "action affecting title to property" was filed at the time Juan Cuevas filed the Complaint.
However, the judgment and decree quieting title that was ultimately entered was not based on
Juan Cuevas' Complaint. Since there was no relief entered on the Complaint, the date of filing
the Complaint cannot be the date an "action affecting title to property" was commenced.
The judgment and decree quieting title in the Underlying Litigation was entered
pursuant to Barraza's Answer and Counterclaim. Accordingly, the date the Answer and
Counterclaim was filed establishes the date that the "action affecting title to the property'' was
commenced. As discussed above, W. Cuevas maintains that, as a matter oflaw, such
Counterclaim was never properly filed and the judgment entered thereon is invalid. However, if
this Court disagrees and determines that the Answer and Counterclaim was either filed or
deemed filed, the earliest possible date that the Answer and Counterclaim might be deemed to
have been filed is the date that the Court of Appeals entered its decision and order reversing the
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district court's denial ofBarraza's motion to set aside the default judgment that was entered
against him: June 24, 2008. The quitclaim deed transferring title to the Property to W. Cuevas
was recorded on June 20, 2007, more than a year before Barraza received permission from the
Court of Appeals to file the Answer and Counterclaim thereby commencing the action that
ultimately affected the Property. Because W. Cuevas obtained title to the Property prior to the
earliest possible date Barraza could, conceivably, have been deemed to filed the Counterclaim,
W. Cuevas cannot be said to have been "in privity" with Juan Cuevas for purposes of res
judicata.
From a practical standpoint, the analysis set forth herein is the only one that can
ensure that all parties with an interest in the property had the ability to protect their rights
throughout the pendency of the litigation. After default judgment was entered quieting title in
favor of Juan Cuevas, Juan Cuevas transferred title to the Property. At such time, the status of
the litigation was uncertain, at best. There was nothing in the land records so much as indicating
that a dispute was pending with respect to the Property. 5 Though a motion to set aside default
was subsequently filed, it was initially denied by the district court and that decision was not
reversed on appeal until over one year later. At the time the Court of Appeals reversed the
district court's order- theoretically giving Barraza permission to file the Answer and
Counterclaim, though further action by the district court was necessary - Barraza had the duty to
file and serve the same, which he failed to do. Also, given that Barraza had not previously filed

5

The suggestion that title to the property was transferred by quitclaim deed because W.
Cuevas could not obtain title insurance due to the lien filed by Barraza and the existence of the
pending litigation, no notice of which appeared in the land records, is speculative at best. There
is no evidence in the record supporting this conclusion and Barraza has cited to no authority that
a quitclaim deed conveying title to property has any less force and effect than a warranty deed.
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a lis pendens, it would have been prudent for Barraza to conduct a title search and ensure that no
other persons or entities were claiming title to the Property at the time the Answer and
Counterclaim was filed.
In short, the procedural defects and irregularities set forth herein are unique and

unusual only because there are well-established mechanisms available to a party standing in
Barraza's shoes that would help protect him at every stage of the litigation. As a non-party and
non-attorney who understood that the Underlying Litigation had quieted title in favor of Juan
Cuevas and who was relying on the land records to keep him apprised of the status of title to the
Property, these same protections and procedures were not available to W. Cuevas and he was
prejudiced by Barraza's failure to comply with these procedural formalities. Accordingly, as a
matter of equity and good conscience, the negative effects of the procedural defects and
irregularities in the Underlying Litigation should be borne by Barraza, not W. Cuevas.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, W. Cuevas respectfully requests that this Court find the
judgment entered in the underlying litigation is invalid and/or has no preclusive effect regarding
W. Cuevas' rights to the Property. Addressing the merits of the case, W. Cuevas respectfully
requests that title to the Property be quieting in his name.
DATED this 27th day of October, 2009.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

72---C ~ ~

By
R~becca A. Rainey - ofthe"
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27th day of October, 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and
addressed to the following:
Robert Ward
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD

340 East 2nd North
Mountain Home, ID 83647
Facsimile (208) 587-3144
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(~ Facsimile

Rebecca A. Rainey
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK

i. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
WILFRJDO CUEVAS,
Case No. CV09-8 l 75
Plaintiff,
vs.
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any); LIOBALDO GARZA, an
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN
EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN AS
29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO,

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

On September 22, 2009, Plaintiff Wilfrido Cuevas ("Cuevas") filed a motion for
summary judgment ("Motion") pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Cuevas requested
a holding that the judgment quieting title in favor of Defendant Bernardino Barraza ("Barraza")
entered in Case No. CV-07-3536 is void and, alternatively, a judgment that resjudicata does not
bar Cuevas from asserting his interest in the Property that is subject to the dispute in the abovecaptioned action.
On October 21, 2009, Barraza filed an Objection and Motion to Strike the
Affidavit ofWilfrido Cuevas filed in support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.
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Both Motions were fully briefed and addressed by the parties. Oral argument on
both Motions was held on November 3, 2009, before the Honorable Judge Gregory Culet at the
Canyon County Courthouse. Based upon the argument of the parties and the pleadings and
affidavits on file with the Court, the findings and conclusions rendered by the Court at such
hearing, and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED and this does order that Defendant's Objection and
Motion to Strike is DENIED;
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED and this does order that Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as follows:
1.

Cuevas' request that the judgment entered in Case No. CV-07-3536

quieting title in favor of Barraza be declared void and of no force and effect is GRANTED;
2.

Cuevas' request that the judgment entered in Case No. CV-07-3536 not

operate as res Judicata and not have a preclusive effect so as to bar the claims for relief set forth
in the above-captioned matter is GRANTED.
DATED this!]__ day of November, 2009.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h i s ~ day of November, 2009, I caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
Rebecca A. Rainey
MOFFA IT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
P.O. Box 829
Boise, ID 83701-0829
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Robert Ward
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD

340 East 2nd North
Mountain Home, ID 83647
Facsimile (208) 587-3144
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza

~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

,MU.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Clerk of the Court
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ROBERT WARD
HALL, FRJElJL Y & WARD
Artorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza
340 East 2nd North Street
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-4412
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144
Tdaho State Bar Number 4442
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D.BUTLER,DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF CANYON
Wil.FRIDO CUEVAS, an individual,

Case No. CV09~8175

Plaintiff.,
vs.
RRRNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any), LJOBALDO GARZA, an
individual and spouse (if W1y); DOES I
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBF.D
IN EXHIBIT "A'\ COMMONLY KNOWN
AS 29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA. IDAHO,

MOTION TO RECONSIDER
AND/OR TO CLARIFY ORDER
GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.
COMES NOW BRRNARDlNO BARRAZA, Defendan.t herein, by and through his
attorney of record, Robert Ward of the firm Hall, Friedly & Ward, and pursuant to I.R.C.P.
Rule l l(a)(2) hereby moves the Court to reconsider and/or clarify its Order Granting

Plainliff's Motion for Summary Judgmenl entered on November 10, 2009, for the reason
that Defendant believes the current order does not reflect the Court's ruling at the hearing
on November 3, 2009. It was Defendant's understanding that the Court ruled that the prior
judgment in Case No. CV*07-3536 was void only as to Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas.

Defendant, Bernardino Barraza. previously submitted a proposed order to the Court via
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facsimile the same day Defendant received Plaintiffs proposed order, which he believes
more accurately reflects the Court' .s ruling.
The Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment as currently worded
may cause an absurd result. Upon Defendant, Bemardino Barraza. proving that he is the
rightful owner of the property in the present case, he would th1;m have to re-litigate the prior

Case No. CV-07-3536 against Juan Cueva.:; even though no motion to set aside judgmt:11t
nor an appeal was ever filed.
DATED this _.2:!2..._ day of November, 2009.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HER.EBY CERTIFY that upon the rf!-l) day of November, 2009, I caused to be
served a true und correct copy of Motion to Reconsider and/or Clarify Order Onm.Ling

Plaintiff's Motion for Swnmary Judgment by the method indicated below, addressed to the

fbllowing:
U.S. Mail

REBECCA A. RAINEY

MOFFATI, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK
& FIELDS, CHTD.

Hand Delivered
___L'Overnight Mail

V

P.O. BOX829
BOISE. ID 83 701
FAX: (208) 385-5384

FAX

.
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ROBERT WARD
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza
340 East 2nd North Street
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-4412
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144
Idaho State Bar Number 4442
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual,

Case No. CV09-8175

Plaintiff,

AMENDED ANSWER
AND COUNTERCLAIM

vs.

BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any), LIO BALDO GARZA, an
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED
IN EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN
AS 29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO,
Defendants.

ANSWER

COMES NOW, Defendant Bernardino Barraza, by and through his attorney of
record, Robert Ward of the firm Hall, Friedly & Ward, and in answer to the Complaint to
Quiet Title filed herein by the Plaintiff, admits, denies and alleges as follows:

I
The Defendant denies each and every allegation of the Complaint for Quiet Title
not hereinafter specifically admitted.

II

AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - I
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II
Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of
Plaintiffs Complaint to Quiet Title.

III
Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 25 of Plaintiffs Complaint
to Quiet Title.
IV
In response to paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint to Quiet Title, Defendant admits
that a Quitclaim Deed was recorded purporting that Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez were
quitclaiming whatever interest they may have in said Subject Property to Plaintiff.
V

In response to paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Complaint to Quiet Title, Defendant admits
Plaintiff has been in possession of said Subject Property.
VI
In response to paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs Complaint to Quiet Title, Defendant
admits in the Spring of 2009, Plaintiff attempted to pay the property taxes associated with
the Subject Property and was informed by an individual at the office of the tax assessor that
Plaintiff no longer held title to the Subject Property by virtue of the "Judgment and Decree
Quieting Title" entered in Case No. CV-07-3536 in favor of Defendant, Bernardino
Barraza.

VII
In response to paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs Complaint to Quiet Title, Defendant
admits that Plaintiff is currently in possession of the Subject Property.
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VIII
In response to Plaintiffs First Claim for Relief (Quiet Title) of Plaintiffs
Complaint to Quiet Title, Defendant admits that Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, has
claimed an ownership interest and is the legal owner of the subject property.

IX
In response to Plaintiffs Second Claim for Relief (Quantum Meruit/Unjust
Enrichment) of Plaintiffs Complaint to Quiet Title, Defendant admits .that Defendant,
Bernardino Barraza, entered into a contract with Juan Cuevas which was litigated in
Canyon County Case No. CV-07-3536, which resulted in a judgment quieting title to the
Subject Property in Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, name. Defendant denies the
remainder of said claim.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Unclean hands in that Plaintiff received the Quitclaim Deed during litigation
between his predecessor in interest and Defendant, and took no action to notify Defendant
of any possible transfer of any interest.
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff should be equitably estopped from claiming any intere·st in the Subject
Property.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFNSE
Resjudicata in that ownership of the Subject Property was already adjudicated.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff could not acquire by Quitclaim Deed ownership of the Subject Property
since his predecessor in title was not the owner of the property.
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FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff should be estopped from claiming any equitable remedy of unjust
enrichment due to Plaintiff's unclean hands.

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff is not the real party in interest regarding any contract which was never
assigned to Plaintiff.

EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiff was aware of the previous quiet title action between his predecessor in
interest and Defendant, and was named as one of the possible claimants Does 1-X, and took
no action to protect any interest he may have had.
COUNTERCLAIM

For cause of action against the Plaintiff, the Defendant Bernardino Barraza
complains and alleges as follows:

I
The Plaintiff, to the best of Defendant's knowledge, is a resident of Canyon
County, Idaho.

II
The Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, is now and has been during all of the times
mentioned herein a resident of Canyon County, Idaho.

II
II
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III
The subject of this litigation is real property located in Canyon County, Idaho, more
particularly described as follows:
A part of the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter, Section 19, Township 6
North, Range 5 West, Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho, more particularly
described to-wit:
Commencing at the Southwest corner of the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast
Quarter, Section 19, Township 6 North, Range 5 West, Boise Meridian, the
INITIAL POINT of this description; thence
North 0°07' East 924 feet, along the West line of the said Southwest Quarter of the
Southeast Quarter; thence
South 55°15' East 336.82 feet; thence
South 0°07' West 730 feet, parallel to the said West line, to a point on the South
line of the said Southwest Quarter of the Southeast Quarter; thence
South 89°35' West 277.15 feet, along the said South line to the INITIAL POINT
OF THIS DESCRIPTION.

IV
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, claims an interest in the subject property and is the
rightful owner of said property.
V

Plaintiff claims an ownership interest adverse to Defendant, Bernardino Barraza.

VI
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, is entitled to an order from this Court granting
Defendant quiet title to the subject property.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT

VII
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, purchased the subject property from the parties'
predecessor in interest and paid a valuable consideration.

II
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VIII
Plaintiff also claims to have purchased the subject property from the parties'
predecessor in interest but has only paid rent with no additional funds to apply towards the
purchase price.

IX
It would be inequitable and a windfall to Plaintiff to allow Plaintiff to obtain title to
the subject property over the claims of the Defendant, Bernardino Barraza.
X
Defendant has retained the law firm of Hall, Friedly & Ward, of Mountain Home,
Idaho to defend this action on his behalf and has agreed to pay said attorneys a reasonable
fee for their services.
WHEREFORE, the Defendant prays for judgment as follows:
1. That Plaintiffs Complaint to Quiet Title be dismissed;
2. That Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, be awarded quiet title to the subject
property;
3. That Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, be awarded his reasonable attorney fees
and costs incurred in this action; and
4. That the court grant such other and further relief to the Defendant, Bernardino
Barraza, as it shall deem proper.
DATED this

1!4- day of December, 2009.

Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino
Barraza
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon the
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day of December, 2009, I caused to be

served a true and correct copy of Amended Answer and Counterclaim by the method
indicated below, addressed to the following:
REBECCA A. RAINEY
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK
& FIELDS, CHTD.
P.O. BOX 829
BOISE, ID 83701
FAX: (208) 385-5384
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Mark C. Peterson, ISB No. 6477
Rebecca A. Rainey, ISB No. 7525
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIBLDS, CHARTERED

101 South Capitol Boulevard, 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
mcp@moffatt.com
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK
D. BUTLER, DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
WILFRIDO CUEVAS,
Ca$e No. CV09-8175
j

Plaintiff,

ANSWER TO DEFENDANT
BERNARDINO BARRAZA'S
COUNTERCLAIM

vs.
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any}; LIOBALDO GARZA, an
individual and spouse (if any}; DOES I
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS
TO THE REAL PROPERIT DESCRIBED IN
EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN AS
29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO,
Defendants.
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any};
Counterclaim ant.

vs.
WILFRIDO CUEVAS,
Counterdefendant.
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COMES NOW plaintiff/counterdefendant Wilfrido Cuevas {"W. Cuevas"). by
and through undersigned counsel of record. and hereby answers and responds to defendant/
counterclaimant Bernardino Barraza's {"Barraza") Counterclaim ("Counterclaim") as follows:

FIRST DEFENSE
Barraza's Counterclaim fails to state a claim against W. Cuevas upon which relief
can be granted and shou1d be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b){6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure.
SECOND DEFENSE

1.

W. Cuevas denies each and every allegation ofBarraza.'s Counterclaim

not herein express]y and specifically admitted.
2.

W. Cuevas lacks sufficient infonnation and knowledge to either admit or

deny the allegations contained in Paragraph 2 of the Counterclaim, and therefore denies the

same.
3.

W. Cuevas admits the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the

4.

W. Cuevas denies the allegations contained in Paragraphs 6, 7 and 9 of the

5.

As to the allegations contained in Paragraph 4 of the Counterclaim,

Com1terclaim.

Counterclaim.

W. Cuevas admits only that Barraza is claiming an interest in the subject property. W. Cuevas
denies that Barraza has a valid interest in the subject property and denies that Barraza is the
rightful owner of said property.
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6.

As to the allegations contained in Paragraph 5 of the Counterclaim,

W. Cuevas admits that Barraza is claiming an ownership interest in the subject property.
W. Cuevas denies the remaining allegations contained in Paragraph 5 of the Counterclaim, to the
extent Paragraph 5 implies Barraza has a valid ownership interest in the subject property.

7.

As to the allegations contained in Paragraph 8 of the Counterclaim,

W. Cuevas admits only that he purchased the subject property. W. Cuevas denies the remaining
allegations contained in Paragraph 8.

8.

As to the allegations contained in Paragraph 10 of the Counterclaim,

W. Cuevas denies that Barraza is entitled to any award of attorneys' fees in this matter.

9.

W. Cuevas denies Barraza's prayer for relief.
THIRD DEFENSE

Barraza's claims are barred in whole or in part by waiver and estoppel.

FOURTH DEFENSE
Barraza's claims are barred in whole or in part by the doctrine of unclean hands .

. FIFl'H DEFENSE
Barraza's claims are barred in whole or in part by the doctrine oflaches.

SIXTH DEFENSE
Barraza's claims are barred to the extent he failed to mitigate his damages as
required by law.

SEVENTH DEFENSE
Barraza's alleged damages, if any, were caused by the acts or omissions of
persons or entities other than W. Cuevas, over whom he had no control, and for whom he had no
responsibility.
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EIGHTH DEFENSE
Barraza's claims are to be barred by the statute of limitations.

NINTH DEFENSE
Barraza's claims are barred in whole or in part based upon the doctrine of unjust
enrichment.

TENTH DEFENSE
Barraza's claims are barred in whole or in part by the statute of frauds.

ELEVENTH DEFENSE
Discovery is ongoing in this case and may disclose the existence of further and
additional defenses. W. Cuevas, therefore, reserves the right to seek leave of the court to amend
its answer to include additional defenses as deemed appropriate.

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES
W. Cuevas has been required to retain the services of an attorney in order to
defend against Barraza's Counterclaim·and is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of
suit pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-120, 12-121 and 12-123, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure, and any other state and federal statutes and/or regulations or law which may
apply.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff/counterdefendant W. Cuevas prays for judgment as
follows:
1.

That defendant/counterclaimant Bernardino Barraza's Counterclaim be

dismissed, with prejudice, without granting any of the relief requested therein;
2.

That the Court grant plaintiff/counterdeferidant W. Cuevas his costs and

expenses, including appropriate and reasonable attorneys• fees, pursuant to Idaho Code
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Sections 12-120, 12-121 and 12-123, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and any
other state and federal statutes and/or regulations or law which may apply;
3.

That the Court grant plaintiff/counterdefendant W. Cuevas such other

relief as the Court deems just and equitable under the circumstances.
DATED this 7th day of January, 2010.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

By_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Mark C. Peterson - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7th day of January, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO DEFENDANT BERNARDINO BARRAZA'S
COUNTERCLAIM to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(~ Facsimile

Robert Ward
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD
340 East 2nd North
Mountain Home, ID 83647
Facsimile (208) 587-3144
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Ba"aza

Mark C. Peterson
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Mark C. Peterson. ISB No. 6477
Rebecca A. Rainey, ISB No. 7525
MOFFA'IT, TuOMAS, BARRETI, ROCK &

FIELDS, CHARTERED

101 South Capitol Boulevard, 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
mcp@moffatt.com
rar@moffatt.com
24163.0000
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK

D.

DEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE THIRD nJDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
WILFRIDO CUEVAS,
Case No. CV09-8175
Plaintiff,
vs.

BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any); LIOBALDO GARZA, an
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I
THROUGH X. UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN
EXFllBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN AS
29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO,

Wll..FRIDO CUEVAS'
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
BERNARDINO BARRAZA'S MOTION
TO RECONSIDER AND/OR CLARIFY
ORDER

Defendants.
BERNARDINO BARRAZA;
Counterclaim.ant,

vs.
WILFRIDO CUEVAS,
Counterdefendant.

WILFRIDO CUEVAS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSfflON TO BERNARDINO
BARRAZ.A'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND/OR AMEND - 1
c11ant1•e1•11.1
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COMES NOW plaintiff/counterdefendant Wilfrido Cuevas, by and through

undersigned counsel of record, and hereby files this memorandum in opposition to defendant
Bernardino Barraza's motion to reconsider and/or clarify order.
Defendant/Counterclaimant Bernardino Barraza (hereafter "Defendant") has filed
a motion to reconsider and/or clarify asking this court to limit its order declaring the order

entered in Case No. CV-07-3536 as void to an order declaring the same as void only as to
plaintiff/counterdefendant Wilfrido Cuevas.

Defendant's motion should be denied for the

reasons that a void judgment is a legal nullity and void as against all parties for all purposes.
See, e.g., Prather v. Loyd, 86 Idaho 45, 50,382 P.2d 910, 912-13 (1963) ("A void judgment is a
nullity, and no rights can be based thereon; it can be set aside on motion or can be collaterally
attacked at any time.") (citations omitted). "Moid judgments may be attacked at any time ...."

Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d 502, 508 (2003) (citing Burnham v. Superior
Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990)). "A void judgment ... may be entirely disregarded or
declared inoperative by any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it . . . . It may .be
attacked by a person adversely affected by it, in any proceeding, direct or collateral, and at any
time." Martin v. Soden, 81 Idaho 274, 281, 340 P.2d 848, 852 (1959) (quoting JOA AM. JUR.

Judgments § 45).
Because a void judgment may be collaterally attacked at any time by any person
aggrieved by the same, the fact that Juan Cuevas, plaintiff/counterdefendant in the underlying
Case No. CV-07-3536, did not file a motion to set aside the judgment and/or file an appeal is
wl!,olly irrelevant and has no bearing on the nature· or scope of the present order. The order

W1LFRIDO CUEVAS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSfflON TO BERNARDINO
BARRAZA'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND/OR AMEND - 2
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,,
entered on the motion for summary judgment is appropriate as written and. therefore,
Defendant's motion to reconsider amend or clarify such order should be denied.

DATED this 21st day of January, 2010.
MOFFAIT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIBLDS, CHARTER.ED

ByLe-'F'---

Mark C. Peterson - Of the Finn
Attorneys for Plaintifti'Countcrdefendant

WILFRIDO CUEVAS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSffiON TO BERNARDINO
BARRAZA,S MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND/OR AMEND - 3
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•
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 21st day of January, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing WILFRIDO CUEVAS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION

TO BERNARDINO BARRAZA•S MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND/OR CLARIFY
ORDER to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Robert Ward
HALL, FRmDLY & WARD

340 East 2nd North
Mountain Home, ID 83647
Facsimile (208) 587-3144
Attorneysfor Defendant Bernardino Barraza

(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
(X) Facsimile

Mark C. Peterson

WILFRIDO CUEVAS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSfflON TO BERNARDINO
BARRAZA'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND/OR AMEND - 4
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
PRESIDING: GREGORY M. CULET

WILFRIDO DURAN CUEVAS,

)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
BERNARDINO FLORES BARRAZA, JR. etal )
)
)
)
Defendant.
)
)

DATE: JANUARY 28, 2010

COURT MINUTE
CASE NO: CV-2009-8175-C
REPORTED BY: Debora Kreidler
TIME: 9:00 A.M.
DCRT1 (11:10-11:39)

________________

This having been the time heretofore set for motion hearing in the above
entitled matter. The plaintiff was not present in court but represented by counsel Ms.
Rebecca Rainey via telephone; the defendant was not present in court, but represented
by counsel Mr. Robert Ward via telephone.
In answer to the Court's inquiry, each of counsel indicated they were ready to
proceed.
Mr. Ward presented argument in support of the defense's Motion to Reconsider.
The Court reviewed the portion of the transcript of which the Court made it's
ruling, and inquired of counsel what was the distinguishing factor in the case regarding
viafax.

Mr. Ward presented further argument in support of the motion.
COURT MINUTES
JANUARY 28, 2010

Page 1
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The Court reviewed footnote five (5) in the viafax case.
Ms. Rainey presented argument in opposition of the defense's Motion to
Reconsider.
Mr. Ward presented further argument in support of the motion.
The Court presented Findings, Facts, and Conclusions of Law and denied the
defense's Motion to Reconsider.
The Court addressed counsel regarding contact from Justice Trout requesting a
copy of the Court's order on Summary Judgment prior to mediation. Further, the Court
addressed counsel regarding submitting an amended order.
In answer to the Court's inquiry, each of advised they did not feel the original
order submitted was vague.
The Court addressed counsel regarding the appeal in this case, and expressed
opinions regarding reaching a resolution in mediation.
In answer to the Court's inquiry, each of counsel indicated a minute entry
indicating the Motion to Reconsider was denied was acceptable.
The Court directed the clerk to send a copy of the minute entry from this date to
counsel.
The Court determined mediation was not yet set in this matter.
Counsel indicated they understood and court adjourned.

Deputy Clerk
COURT MINUTES
JANUARY 28, 2010

Page 2
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Mark C. Peterson, !SB No. 6477
Rebecca A. Rainey, ISB No. 7525
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

101 South Capitol Boulevard, 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
mcp@moffatt.com
rar@moffatt.com
24163.0000
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AUG 3 1 2010
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
WILFRIDO CUEVAS,
Case No. CV09-8175
Plaintiff,
vs.

0

BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any); LIOBALDO GARZA, an
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN
EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN AS
29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO,

WILFRIDO CUEVAS' SECOND
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any);
Counterclaimant,
vs.
WILFRIDO CUEVAS,
Counterdefendant.

(
WILFRIDO CUEVAS' SECOND MOTION FOR
SUMMARYJUDGMENT-1
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COMES NOW Plaintifii'Counterdefendant Wilfrido Cuevas, by and through his
undersigned counsel ofrecord, and hereby files this second motion for summary judgment
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( a). By this second motion for summary judgment,
Wilfrido Cuevas respectfully requests that this Court enter an order:
(i)

Quieting title to the Property in the name of Wilfrido Cuevas free and

clear of any interest claimed by Defendant/Counterclaimant Bernardino Barraza;
(ii)

Ordering that Defendant/Counterclaimant Bernardino Barraza take

nothing by his claims against Wilfrido Cuevas for unjust enrichment.
This motion is supported by all pleadings on file in this matter, including but not
limited to (i) this Court's Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment entered
November 9, 2009; (ii) the Affidavit of Rebecca A. Rainey in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment filed September 21, 2009; (iii) the Affidavit of Wilfrido Cuevas in Support

0

of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment filed September 21, 2009; (iv) the Affidavit of
Bernardino Barraza dated October 20, 2009; (v) the Affidavit of Rebecca A. Rainey in Support
of Wilfrido Cuevas' Second Motion for Summary Judgment, filed contemporaneously herewith,
and (vi) the Memorandum in Support ofWilfrido Cuevas' Second Motion for Summary
Judgment filed contemporaneously herewith.
Plaintiff requests oral argument on this motion.
DATED this 31st day of August, 2010.
MOFFA TT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED
r

By~··
Rebecca A. Rainey - Of the Fi
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Count d

WILFRIDO CUEVAS' SECOND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 31st day of August, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing WILFRIDO CUEVAS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Robert Ward
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD
340 East 2nd North
Mountain Home, ID 83647
Facsimile (208) 587-3144
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

12----f a: /~=

R~becca A. RaineY

WILFRIDO CUEVAS' SECOND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
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Mark C. Peterson, ISB No. 6477
Rebecca A. Rainey, ISB No. 7525
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK&
FIELDS, CHARTERED

101 South Capitol Boulevard, 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone (208) 345-2000
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
mcp@moffatt.com
rar@moffatt.com
24163.0000
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AUG 3 1 2010
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintif£1Counterdefendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUJ~TY OF CANYON
WILFRIDO CUEVAS,
Case No. CV09-8175
Plaintiff,
vs.

0

BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any); LIOBALDO GARZA, an
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN
EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN AS
29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO,

AFFIDAVIT OF REBECCA A. RAINEY
IN SUPPORT OFWILFRIDO CUEVAS'
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any);
Counterclaimant,
vs.
WILFRIDO CUEVAS,
Counterdefendant.

(
AFFIDAVIT OF REBECCA A. RAINEY IN SUPPORT OF WILFRIDO
CUEVAS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
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STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
COUNTY OF ADA )
REBECCA A. RAINEY, having been duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states
as follows:
1.

I am an attorney for plaintiff Wilfrido Cuevas in the above-captioned

matter and, as such, have personal knowledge of the facts contained herein.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of the Warranty

Deed conveying the property that is the subject of the above-captioned matter to Juan M. Cuevas
and Yrene Baez recorded in Canyon County June 15, 1993, as Recorder's Instrument No.
9313282.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of the Response to

Wilfrido Cuevas' First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production to Bernardino Barraza.

0

The document produced as Exhibit A was produced in response to Requests for Productions Nos.

l and 5. Specifically, Request for Production No. 5 sought "any and all documents, contracts, or
agreements between Defendant(s), or any of them, and Juan Cuevas relating to your attempt to
purchase the property." Exhibit A to Exhibit 2 (hereafter, the "English Document") was the only
document produced in response to Request for Production No. 5.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is the Affidavit of Counsel in Support of

Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) filed in Case No. CV-07-3536 on
May 24, 2007. Such affidavit references an attached ''Answer and Counterclaim." Exhibit A to
the Answer and Counterclaim contains the English Document, discussed in paragraph 3, above,
and also contains another document, written in Spanish, which has not been produced by Barraza

(
AFFIDAVIT OF REBECCA A. RAINEY IN SUPPORT OF WILFRIDO
CUEVAS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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in this litigation, but which may be used by him to claim an interest in the property that is the
subject of the above-captioned matter (hereafter, the "Spanish Document").
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of the Affidavit of

Translation of M. Isabel Thornton dated May 21, 2010, providing an English translation of the
Spanish Document.
Further your affiant sayeth naught.
DATED this 31st day of August, 2010.

Rebecca A. Rainey
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 31st day of August, 2010.

NOTARY P~LIC FOR IDAHO
Residing at ~i1, L , J;D
My Commission Expires 5 - J-:3>- /;>-.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
(_)

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 31st day of August, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF REBECCA A. RAINEY IN SUPPORT OF
WILFRIDO CUEVAS' SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served
by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Robert Ward
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD

340 East 2nd North
Mountain Home, ID 83 64 7
Facsimile (208) 587-3144
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

72-e' d/~'
;

Rebecca A. Rainey

0
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ROBERT WARD
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD
Attorneys for Bernardino Barraza
340 East 2nd North Street
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-4412
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144
Idaho State Bar Number 4442

RECEIVED

JUL 2 9 2010
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT,
ROCK & FIELDS, Cl-fTD. '

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual,

Case No. CV09-8175

Plaintiff,
vs.

BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any), LIOBALDO GARZA, an
individual and spouse {if any); DOES I
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED
IN EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN
AS 29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO,

RESPONSE TO WILFRIDO
CUEVAS' FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
TO BERNARDINO BARRAZA

Defendants.
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, hereby responds to Wilfrido Cuevas' First Set of
Interrogatories and Requests for Production to Bernardino Barraza dated May 14, 2010,
as follows:

INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1:

Please state the name, occupation, address and

telephone number (work and home) of each and every person who has, or purports to
have, knowledge of any facts or issues relating to the subject matter of this action.

(

RESPONSE TO WILFRIDO CUEVAS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR
PRODUCTION TO BERNARDINO BARRAZ/\ - I
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RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. l:
Wilfredo Cuevas
Bernardino Barraza
Marta Barraza, (208) 713-3945
Sylvestre Castaneda, (208) 467-9490
Augostin Bergos, (909) 494-0137
Leobardo Garza, (208) 830-2255
Ruben Esquivel, 909-8320
Herminia Cuevas
Maria Cuevas
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Please state the name of each and every person you
intend to call as a lay witness at the trial of this matter, and for each such person, state
with particularity:
(a)

Their residence address and telephone number;

(b)

Their business address and telephone number;

(c)

Their occupation; and

(d)

The substance of their expected testimony.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Defendant, Bernardino Barraza,
has not yet decided who he will call as a lay witness at the trial of this matter. Defendant
will later supplement his response to this interrogatory.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Please state the name of each and every person you
expect to call as an expert witness at the trial of this matter, and for each such person,
state with particularity:

(
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(a)

Their residence address and telephone number;

(b)

Their business address and telephone number;

(c)

The qualifications upon which you intend to rely to establish said person
as an expert witness;

(d)

The subject matter on which said person is expected to testify;

(e)

The substance of the facts and opinions to which he or she is expected to
testify; and

(f)

All other information allowed for inquiry by Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 705 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence.

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Defendant, Bernardino Barraza,
has not retained an expert witness at this point in time.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Please identify, by title, date and subject matter,
each exhibit that you plan to offer into evidence at trial of this matter and the proposed
use and relevance of each such exhibit.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Defendant, Bernardino Barraza,
has not yet determined which exhibits he plans to offer into evidence at trial of this
matter. Defendant will later supplement his response to this interrogatory.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Please identify all taxes paid by you on the property
in question.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Defendant, Bernardino Barraza,
paid taxes for the years 2000, 2001 and 2008.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Please identify all improvements made by you on
the property.

(
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PRODUCTION TO BERNARDINO BARRAZA - 3

000287

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Defendant, Bernardino Barraza,
added a patio, sprinkler system, and grass for the yard. Further, he cleaned and made
numerous repairs to the property, as well as reinstated the ditch rights.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: If any payment was made on the property for which·
you do not have documentation, please identify the source of funds used for the payment,
to whom the payment was made, on what dates, and who - other than yourself - would
have infonnation concerning the making of such payment.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Defendant, Bernardino Barraza,
made some payments to Juan Cuevas with funds he received from working, but he cannot
recall the exact dates of said payments.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Please identify all facts that support your contention

()

that all payments made by Plaintiff were for rent with no funds being applied towards the
purchase price of the property.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, told
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, he was only renting the property. The amount of each
payment was in the amount of the rent. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, never had a written
contract to purchase the property.
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Please explain the circumstances that caused you to
vacate the property.
RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Defendant, Bernardino Barraza,
vacated the property due to Juan Cuevas threatening bodily harm to Defendant,
Bernardino Barraza, and to his family.

(
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REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. l: Please produce copies of any and all
documents you relied upon and/or identified in your answers to each of the above-stated
interrogatories.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. l: Attached hereto please find a copy of the
following documents:
Exhibit A

Purchase Agreement dated March 6, 2001

Exhibit B

Receipts for payments to Juan Cuevas

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: Please produce copies of any and all
documents evidencing payments made by you to Juan Cuevas for the purchase of the
property.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 2: Attached hereto as Exhibit B are copies of
the receipts for payments made to Juan Cuevas by Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, by
check or deposited into Juan Cuevas' bank account. Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, does
not have receipts for some of the cash payments made directly to Juan Cuevas.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Please produce copies of any and all
documents showing taxes paid on the property.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 3: Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, does not
have any documentation showing taxes he paid in the property.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: Please produce copies of any and all
documents evidencing improvements made, by you, to the property.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 4: Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, does. not
have any documentation showing improvements he made to the property.

(
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: Please produce copies of any and all
documents, contracts, or agreements between Defendant(s), or any of them, and Juan
Cuevas relating to your attempt to purchase the property.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 5: Please reference Exhibit A.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6: Please produce copies of any and all
documents, contracts or agreements between you and Juan Cuevas relating to your
agreement to vacate the property.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 6: Attached hereto please find a copy of the
following documents:
Exhibit C - Claim of Lien recorded May 6, 2002

C

/

(

l

DATED thiscR:fi_ day of.._l.....,.__fe_~---n-----'' 2010.
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STATE OF IDAHO

a

/'l,(_J)/

)

c~ ) ss.

COUNTY OF Cl..NY0N-

)

BERNARDINO BARRAZA, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that he is
the Defendant named in the foregoing Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, Response to
Wilfrido Cuevas' First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production to Bernardino
Barraza; that he has read said responses, knows the contents thereof, and believes the
facts therein stated to be true.

ne;:r-4&¥:A, b<U

---is:c:YJ,,.y:,:,, 2 a

BERNARDINO BARRAZA
Defendant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

(

RESPONSE TO WJLFRIDO CUEVAS' FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORJES AND REQUESTS FOR
PRODUCTION TO BERNARDINO BARRAZA - 7

000291.

"'

'

·"

000292

',

()

..

f
l

CLAIM OF LIEN
ST ATE OF IDAHO

)

:ss
COUNTY OF Qanyon. · )
BEFORE ME, the undersigned Notary Public, personally appeared Bernardino Barraza and
Liobaldo Gana

, who being first duly sworn, says that he is the lienor herein or the

agentofthelienorherein, whoseaddressis 16558 Blue Spruce Rd. Nampa, Id, 83,651.

and that in accordance with a contract with Juan Manuel Cuevas.
lienor furnished labor, services or materials consisting of unpaid refund in the
$20.000.00 for the payments on Real estate Title.

on the following described real property in

Canyon

amQJ1nt_

County, State ofldaho, and .more fully

described as
''Exibit A" Attched and made part hereof.
and owned by Juan Manuel Cuevas and Yrene Baez sigle persons.
for a total value of Twenty thousand dllS and 00/100

dollars (S20, 000,

mo

ofwhichtherercmainsunpaidTwenty thousand dlls and 00/l0Qlo]Jars (SZ0.000.!J).O
That the lienor fumisbed the first of the items on the fifth

dayofJa.nuary

and that !Jre lienor ~ished the last of the items on the fifth day of January
'""'··~

, 200.L .

200.l.._.

That the lienor served copies of the notice on the contractor on the __Ill!_ day ofinarch . 2002,

200'_by _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, and on the subcontractor on the _ _ _ day of
, 200_b

:~~~:7
ieoor orlienor's Agent
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ROBERT WARD
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD
Attorneys for Bernardino Barraza
340 East 2nd North Street
Mountain Home, Idaho 8364 7
Telephone: (208) 587-4412
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144
Idaho State Bar Number 4442

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual,

Case No. CV09-8 l 75

Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF SERVICE

vs.

BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any), LIO BALDO GARZA, an
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED
1N EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN
AS 29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO,

I
1

I
I
I

Defendants.

f..

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on the

cJ3_ day of July, 2010, true and correct copies

of Defendant, Bernadina Barraza's, Response to Wilfrido Cuevas' First Set of Interrogatories
and Requests for Production to Bernardino Barraza were served, by depositing the same in the
United States Mail, postage prepaid, upon the following attorneys at the addresses shown below:
REBECCA A. RAINEY
MOFFA TT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK
& FIELDS, CHTD.
P.O. BOX829
BOISE, ID 83701
FAX: (208) 385-5384

(
NOTICE OF SERVICE- I

000300

VU.s.Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
FAX

0

(
NOTICE OF SERVICE - 2

000301-

()

EXHIBIT 3
(

000302

)

ROBERT WARD
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD

F-___,A.MJ!.-)
L Et) EJ.P.M.
_

Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza
340 East 2nd North Street
Mountain Home, Idaho 8364 7
Telephone: (208) 587-4412
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144
Idaho State Bar Nwnber 4442

MAY 24 7JJ07
CANYON COUNTY CLERK

D.BUTLEA,DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
JUAN MANUEL CUEVAS and YRENE
BAEZ, individuals,

Case No. CV-07-3536
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET
ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
PURSUANT TO RULE 60(b)

Plaintiffs,
VS.

()

BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual,
LIOBALDO GARZA, an individual, and
DOES I through X, unknown claimants to the
real property described in Exhibit "A",
commonly known as 29452 Pearl Road,
Parma, Idaho,
Defendants.
STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF ELMORE

)
) ss.
)

ROBERT WARD, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1. That I am the Attorney for the Defendant Bernardino Barraza in the aboveentitled action.

I make this Affidavit in Support of Defendant's Motion to Set Aside

Default Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b).
2. That Defendant discussed this case with me, and paid me for my legal advice;
however, at that time, no lawsuit was filed and therefore I could not file a Notice of

)

Appearance on behalf of Defendant.
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO
RULE60(b)- I

000303

3. A Complaint was later filed and Defendant was served with the Complaint, but

)

did not tell me, thus, no Answer and Counterclaim was filed.
4. Defendant believed that I was representing him after our discussions regarding
the case, and therefore had the mistaken belief that he did not need to let me know that a
lawsuit had been filed and a lady had given him papers as service of process.

5. Defendant speaks very little English, cannot read or write English, and thus did
not understand the notice in the Summons requiring him to file a responsive pleading

within twenty (20) days.
6. Defendant has a meritorious defense as outlined in the proposed Answer and
Counterclaim attached hereto, and incorporated as if set forth in full herein.
7.

Defendant respectfully requests the Court to set aside the default judgment

entered in this case and allow Defendant to file the Answer and Counterclaim attached
( )

hereto.
FURTHER, YOUR AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT.
DATED this 2..:3

day of May, 2007.

HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD

Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino
Barraza

(ci

SWORN to before

this ~ a y of May, 2007.

NOTARY PUBLIC,.Stat
Residing at Mountain
Commission Expires:__.._ _ _ _ _ __

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL lN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO
RULE60(b)-2
000304

CERTIFICATE~ S~YICE

)

I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon t h e ~ of May, 2007, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Set
Aside Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b) by the method indicated below, addressed to the
following:

MARK D. PERISON, P.A.
3149 S. 9TH STREET, SUITE 300
P.O. Box 6575
BOISE, ID 83707-6575
(208) 331-1200
(208) 343-5838 FAX

/U.S.Mail
- - Hand Delivered
- - Overnight Mail
FAX

( )

{

i

AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO
RULE60(b)-3

000305

)

ROBERT WARD
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD

Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza
340 East 2nd North Street
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-4412
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144
Idaho State Bar Number 4442

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
JUAN MANUEL CUEVAS and YRENE
BAEZ, individuals,

Case No. CV-07-3536

Plaintiffs,
ANSWERAND
vs.
COUNTERCLAIM
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual,
LIOBALDO GARZA, an individual, and
DOES I through X, unknown claimants to the
real property described in Exhibit "A",
commonly known as 29452 Pearl Road,
Parma, Idaho,

Fee Category: J(8)(a)
Fee: $62.00

Defendants.

ANSWER
COMES NOW, Defendant Bernardino Barraza, by and through his attorney of
record, Robert Ward of the firm Hall, Friedly & Ward, and in answer to the Complaint
filed herein by the Plaintiffs, admits, denies and alleges as follows:

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAlM - l

000306

I.
)

The Defendant denies each and every allegation of the Complaint not hereinafter
specifically admitted.
II.
Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraphs III, IV, V, VI, VII, IX, X
and XI of Plaintiffs' Complaint to Quiet Title.
III.
Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs II, XII, XIII, XIV, XVI,
XVII, XVIII and XIX of Plaintiffs' Complaint to Quiet Title.
N.
In response to paragraph I of Plaintiffs' Complaint to Quiet Title, Defendant admits

only that Plaintiff Juan Manuel Cuevas is an individual currently residing in Arizona, and
()

that PlaintiffYrene Baez is an individual currently residing in Arizona. Defendant denies
the remainder of said paragraph

V.
In response to paragraph VIII of Plaintiffs' Complaint to Quiet Title, Defendant

admits only that Plaintiffs' dispute that they owe Defendant money, and denies the
remainder of said paragraph.

VI.
In respons'e to paragraph XV of Plaintiffs' Complaint to Quiet Title, Defendant

admits only that Plaintiff seeks Quiet Title, and denies the remainder of said paragraph.

)
ANSWER AND COUNfERCLAIM - 2

000307

)

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs sold to Defendant the Property as described in Plaintiffs' Complaint to
Quiet Ti~e; _Therefore, Defendant is the owner of the property and n~t Plaintiffs.

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Plaintiffs should be equitably estopped from denying they sold the property to
Plaintiff and estopped from asserting their claim for Quiet Title to the property.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
More than five years have elapsed since Plaintiff sold the property to Defendant
therefore Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

COUNTERCLAIM
(

-.

'I,__

,

)

For cause of action against the Plaintiffs, the Defendant Bernardino Barraza
complains and alleges as follows:
I.
The Plaintiffs, to the best of Defendant's knowledge, are residents of the State of
Arizona
II.

The Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, is now and has been during all of the times
mentioned herein a resident of Canyon County, Idaho.

m.
The subject of this litigation is real property located in Canyon County, Idaho,
known as 29452 Pearl Road, Panna, and which is more accurately described in Exhibit A

ANSWER AND COUNIBRCLAIM - 3

000308

.of the Plaintiffs' Complaint to Quiet Title. Exhibit A is incorporated herein by this
)

reference as if set forth in its entirety. Defendant claims an interest in said property, and
jurisdiction is appropriate under Idaho Code § 5-514.
BREACH OF WRITTEN CONTRACT
N.

Plaintiff executed a written contract on March 6, 2001, wherein Plaintiff sold the
subject real property to Defendant for eighty thousand dollars ($80,000.00). See attached
written contract marked "Exhibit l ".

V.
Defendant Bernardino Barraza paid a total of twenty-two thousand six hundred
thirty-five dollars and seventy-six cents ($22,635.76) as a down payment on the subject
property.

()

VI.
Plaintiffs now claim the subject property was not sold to Defendant.
VII.

Plaintiffs have now filed a Quiet Title action, and therefore have breached the
written contract wherein they sold the subject property to Defendant.
BREACH OF ORAL CONTRACT

vm.
Plaintiffs ·promised to reimburse Defendant twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00)
upon resale of the subject property if Defendant would vacate the subject property.
IX.

Defendant vacated the subject property.

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - 4

000309

•,'

X.

)

Plaintiffs, as of this date, have failed to reimburse Defendant the twenty thousand
dollars ($20,000.00) as promised.
XI.

Plaintiffs have now filed this Quiet Title action to avoid paying Defendant twenty
thousand dollars ($20,000.00) as promised, and therefore have breached the oral contract of
the parties.
BREACH OF IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT

XII.
Defendant incorporates paragraphs I - XII of Defendant's Counterclaim into this
cause of action as if set forth in their entirety
XIII.

Defendants' actions and Plaintiffs actions as set forth above created an implied-in-

fact contract.
XIV.

Defendants have now breached the implied-in-fact contract by filing a quiet title
action to avoid paying Defendant his $20,000.00.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT

xv.
Defendant incorporates paragraphs I-XIV of Defendant's Counterclaim into this
cause of action as if set forth in their entirety.

ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - 5

00031.0

XVI.
'

)

Plaintiffs have filed a Quiet Title action in an attemptto negate Defendant's interest
in the property and avoid paying Defendant twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) as
promised, all of which would result in an unjust enrichment to Plaintiffs.

EOUITABLE ESTOPPLE
XVII
Plaintiff represented to Defendant he would reimburse Defendant twenty thousand
dollars ($20,000.00) if Defendant would vacate the property.

xvm
Plaintiff intended Defendant to act upon his representation and vacate the property.
XIX

Plaintiff has now filed a Quiet Title action to avoid paying Defendant the twenty
( )

thousand dollars ($20,000.00) as represented.

xx
Defendant was unaware that Plaintiff would refuse to reimburse him as Plaintiff
represented.
XXI
Defendant relied upon Plaintiff's representation to him.
XXII

Defendarit acted upon Plaintiff's representation and vacated the property.

)
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - 6

00031.1.

'

•

QUIET TITLE

)

XXIII

The defendant incorporates into this cause of action paragraphs I-XXII of
Defendant's Counterclaim as if set forth in full.
XXIV

Defendant claims a cause of action against Plaintiffs and complains of Plaintiffs
named in this action and all other persons unknown claiming any right, title, estate, lien or
interest in the real property described adverse to plaintiff's title, and for a cause of action
alleges the following.
XXV

The true names or capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise,
of Cross Claimants named in this action as Does I through X are unknown to Defendant,

()

who sues such Cross Claimants by such fictitious names, and Defendant will amend this
counterclaim to show their true names and capacities, upon such ascertainment.
XXVI

The defendant is the owner of real property located in Canyon County, Idaho,
known as 29452 Pearl Road, Panna, and which is more accurately described in Exhibit A
of the Plaintiffs' Complaint to Quiet Title. Exhibit A is incorporated herein by this
reference as if set forth in its entirety.

xxvn
Plaintiffs claim an interest and estate in such property adverse to Defendant;
Plaintiffs' claim is without any right, and Plaintiffs have no right, estate, title, lien or
interest in or to the property, or any part of

it:

ANSWER AND COUNfERCLAIM • 7

00031.2

.

.•

xxvm
)

Cross Claimants Does I through Doe X, may claim some estate, right, title, lien or
interest in or to the property adverse to Plaintiff's title, and such claim or claims constitute
a cloud on Defendant's title to the property.
XXIX

Defendant has retained the law firm of Hall, Friedly & Ward of Mountain Home,
Idaho, to prosecute this action on Defendant's behalf and has agreed to pay said attorneys a
reasonable fee for their services. T.pe sum of$150.00 per hour is a reasonable sum to be
paid for such attorney's fees.
XXX

Defendant is entitled to recover his attorney fees incurred in the prosecution of this
counterclaim against the defendant pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 6-324, 12-120, 12-121, and
Rule 54(e) of the Idaho Rules ofC~vil Procedure.
XXXI

WHEREFORE, the Defendant prays for judgment as follows:
1.

That Plaintiffs Complaint to Quiet Title be dismissed;

2.

That Plaintiffs be estopped from claiming the property was not sold to

Defendant, or in the alternative, be ordered to reimburse Defendant twenty thousand
dollars ($20,000.00);
•,

3.

.

That the Plaintiffs be ordered to specifically perform the written contract

and/or oral contract;
4.

Plaintiffs, and all persons claiming under them, be required to set forth the

nature of their claims to the described real property;
/

''
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - 8

00031.3

.·

')

5.

All adverse claims to such real property be detennined by a decree of this

6.

The decree adjudge that Defendant owns in fee simple, and is entitled to the

Court;

quiet and peaceful possession of, such real property, and that Plaintiffs, and all persons
.

~·

.

"

claiming under them, have no estate, right, title, lien, or interest in or to the real property or
any part of it;
7. ·

The decree permanently enjoin each Plaintiff, and all persons claiming

under them, from asserting any adverse claim to Defendant's property;
8.

For costs and disbursements, including reasonable attorney fees in the

amount of $1 S0.00 per hour; and
9.

That the court grant such other and further relief to the Defendant as it shall

deem proper.

DATED this -2:l_ day of May, 2007.

Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino
Barraza

)
ANSWER AND COUNTER.CLAIM - 9

00031.4

..
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

COUNTY OF ELMORE,

)
) ss.
)

Bernardino Barraza, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he is one of the
Defendants named in the foregoing Answer and Counterclaim, that he has read said
.

. .

.

Answer and Counterclaim, knows the contents thereof and believes the facts therein stated
to be true.

( )
CERTIFICATE~:~RVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon the~~y of May, 2007, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of Answer and Counterclaim by the method indicated below,
addressed to the following:

MARK D. PERISON, P.A.
3149 S. 9rn STREET, SUITE 300
P.O. Box: 6575
BOISE, ID 83707-6575
(208) 331-1200
(208) 343-5838 FAX

/u.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
FAX

=

)
ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - 10

00031.5
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EXHIBIT 4
)
0003'.18

Affidavit of Translation

)
I,

l~I :Thdrclof\., am fluent in English and
pAAL
. I hereby certify that I have translated and verified the

~-

following document(s) which is/are attached to this Affidavit:
Description of document(s): (title or type, document date, number of pages)

I further certify that, to the best of my knowledge, the attached document(s)
written in English is/are a true and ~ccurate translation of the attached
docurnent(s) written in
SfO.J\lSD
.

(Signa

(

)

~u

(Print Name)

-------------------------------------------------------------12=-=~"'""""""j.._,~-....

STATE OF
O
______
COUNTY OF _ _
_..._ttz2_,__~_fr..L..-_ _ _ _ __

Subscribed and affirmed, or sworn to, before me on this
2010 , by

H41

,

2/

H. Is&b:<1 ·zh.mn tzr:;
(Print Name)

(1Qfl8ture of Notary Public)

My commission expires on: _()_~..
J..;;...;1.R~·.....
/-'-t'.-'--f _ _ __
Notary Seal:
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Mark C. Peterson, ISB No. 6477
Rebecca A. Rainey, ISB No. 7525
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

101 South Capitol Boulevard, 10th Floor
Post Office Box 829
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD ITJDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
WILFRIDO CUEVAS,
Case No. CV09-8 l 75
Plaintiff,
vs.
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any); LIO BALDO GARZA, an
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN
EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN AS
29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
WILFRIDO CUEVAS' SECOND
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.

BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any);
Counterclaim ant,
VS.

WILFRIDO CUEVAS,
Counterdefendant.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the present matter, both Wilfrido Cuevas ("Wilfrido") and Bernardino Barraza

("Barraza") are claiming title to the property commonly known as 29452 Pearl Road, Parma,
Idaho (the "Property"), through the same predecessor in interest: Juan Cuevas. 1 In order to
establish that his title to the Property is superior to any interest claimed by Barraza, Wilfrido had
the task of first establishing that the judgment entered in the prior litigation was either void
and/or did not operate as res judicata regarding his interest in the Property and then establish that
Wilfrido otherwise has superior title to the Property. The first of these issues was disposed ofby
Wilfrido's first motion for summary judgment, granted by this Court on or about November 12,
2009. The remaining question, and the sole remaining issue relating to title to the Property, is
whether Wilfrido's claim of fee simple ownership in the Property is superior to any interest in
the Property claimed by Barraza.

( )

In support of his claim, Wilfrido has a duly recorded quitclaim deed, executed by

Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez that was recorded in Canyon County on June 20, 2007, as
Instrument No. 2007043067 (the "Quitclaim Deed"). Conversely, in support ofBarraza's
claimed interest in the property, he has an undated document, written in Spanish, which Barraza
alleges to be a purchase and sale contract ("Spanish Document'); a dated document, written in
English, which Barraza alleges to be a purchase and sale contract ("English Document"); and a
purported "Claim of Lien," generally in the form of a mechanic's and materialman's lien,
alleging that it secures his interest in refund of a $20,000.00 down payment towards the Property.

1

Wilfrido also claims title to the property through Yrene Baez who owned the Property
jointly with Juan Cuevas and joined in the transfer of the Property to Wilfrido.
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Even assuming, as this Court must do on a motion for summary judgment,2 that
)

Wilfrido had full knowledge of the Spanish Document, the English Document, and the Claim of
Lien prior to the time he recorded the Quitclaim Deed because the Quitclaim Deed satisfies
every element of Idaho's statutes regarding the transfer of an interest in property, and because
Barraza cannot establish a legally recognizable interest in the Property, as a matter oflaw
Wilfrido's claim of fee simple title to the Property prevails. Accordingly, Wilfrido is entitled to
an entry of summary judgment, quieting title to the Property in his name.

If this Court enters an order quieting title in Wilfrido's name, the only remaining
issue in this litigation is whether Barraza has stated a claim for unjust enrichment against
Wilfrido. Because Barraza has not pled, and cannot prove, the elements necessary to establish an
unjust enrichment claim, summary judgment on that remaining issue is appropriate on the
present motion as well. Accordingly, by the present motion for summary judgment, this Court
has before it sufficient legal and factual bases to dispose of all issues remaining in this lawsuit.

II.
1.

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS

Juan M. Cuevas, a single man, and Yrene Baez, a single woman, held title

to the Property pursuant to warranty deed executed on June 14, 1993, and recorded in the land
records of Canyon County as Instrument No. 9313282 on June 15, 1993. Affidavit of Rebecca
Rainey in Support of Second Motion for Summary Judgment ("Second Rainey Aff."), Ex. 1.
2.

In August 2003, Wilfrido Cuevas entered into an oral agreement to

purchase the Property from Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez. Affidavit of Wilfrido Cuevas in

2

Moving beyond the present motion for summary judgment, Wilfrido maintains that
there are genuine issues of material fact regarding when he developed actual or constructive
knowledge related to Barraza's alleged interest in the property.

'

)
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Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment ("Cuevas Aff."),

/

-1

~

2. At such time

Wilfrido Cuevas moved onto the Property, began making payments to Juan Cuevas, began
making improvements on the Property, and began paying taxes on the Property. Cuevas Aff.
~~

2, 3, A, and 4.
3.

On or about June 13, 2007, Wilfrido Cuevas paid the remaining balance of

the purchase price to Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez. Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez then executed
a quitclaim deed transferring all of their right, title and interest in the Property to Wilfrido
Cuevas. Cuevas Aff.,
4.

~

6.

On June 20, 2007, Wilfrido Cuevas caused the quitclaim deed to be filed

in the land records of Canyon County as Recorder's Instrument No. 2007043067. Cuevas Aff.,
Ex. D; Affidavit of Rebecca A. Rainey in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
("First Rainey Aff. "), Ex. C.

()

5.

Barraza claims an interest in the Property pursuant to a Claim of Lien

recorded in Canyon County as Recorder's Instrument Nos. 200220593, 200666034, and
2007007336, allegedly securing an "unpaid refund in the amount $20,000 for the payments on
Real Estate Title." First Rainey Aff., Ex. A.
6.

Alternatively, Barraza claims an interest in the Property pursuant to the

English Document, which was produced to Wilfrido during this litigation and identified as
"Purchase Agreement dated March 6, 2001." Second Rainey Aff., Ex. 2.
7.

Alternatively, Barraza claims an interest in the Property pursuant to the

Spanish Document, which was filed with the court in prior litigation related to the Property.
Second Rainey Aff., Exs. 3 and 4.

r)
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III.
')'

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A moving party is entitled to summary judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(c) if the moving party shows that there is an absence of material facts with respect
to a claim and the nonmoving party fails to show specific facts that would support the claim at
trial. Tuttle v. Sudenga Indus., Inc., 125 Idaho 145, 150, 868 P.2d 473,478 (1994); Thomson v.
Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530-31, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037-38 (1994). To withstand

summary judgment, the nonmoving party must "make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of
proof at trial." Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho at 530-31, 887 P.2d at 1037-38
(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102,
765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988)). "'[A] mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts'
is not sufficient to create a genuine issue." Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134
( ,.)

'

Idaho 84, 996 P.2d 303,307 (2000) (quoting Harpole v. State, 131 Idaho 437,439, 958 P.2d 594,

./

596 (1998)). Where the nonmoving party fails to meet his burden of presenting sufficient
evidence to create a triable issue of fact such that the court would grant a motion for a directed
verdict if the case were to go to trial, summary judgment is proper. Jarman v. Hale, 122 Idaho
952, 842 P.2d 288 (Ct. App. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Puckett v. Verska, 144 Idaho
161, 158 P.3d 937 (2007). "If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, what
remains is a question oflaw." City ofKellogg v. Mission Mountain Interests Ltd., Co., 135 Idaho
239,243, 16 P.3d 915,919 (2000)).
IV.

ARGUMENT

The present motion for summary judgment involves two adverse claims of title to
the same real property. This matter can be conclusively resolved, as a matter of law, by

~ )
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reference to Idaho's recording statutes: First, by establishing that Wilfrido has a valid instrument
, )

conveying the Property to him; and, second, by establishing that Barraza does not have any
legally recognizable interest in the Property that would upset the presumption that Wilfrido, as
the holder of title, is the legal owner of the Property.
A.

Wilfrido's Quitclaim Deed is a Valid Instrument, Conveying all of Juan
Cuevas's and Irene Baez's Interest in the Property to Wilfrido.
It is well-settled under Idaho law that "[a] party seeking to quiet title against

another must succeed on the strength of his own title and not the weakness of his adversary.
Kiebertv. Goss, 144 Idaho 225,228, 159 P.3d 862,865 (2007) (citingPincockv. Pocatello Gold
& Copper Mining Co., 100 Idaho 325,331,597 P.2d 211,217 (1979)). Idaho Code Section

55-601, provides that a conveyance of an estate in real property must be made (i) by an
instrument, (ii) in writing, (iii) subscribed by the parting disposing of the same (or his agent), and
(iv) contain the name of the grantee and his complete mailing address. "Idaho law presumes that
the holder of title to property is the legal owner of that property." Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho
264,270, 127 P.3d 167, 173 (2005) (quoting Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 467,469,886 P.2d
772, 774 (1994)). A grantee in possession of a quitclaim deed is presumed to possess legal title
to the property named therein and any other interests the grantor had in the property. Id.
In this case, Wilfrido Cuevas holds legal title to the Property pursuant to a
quitclaim deed that was executed by Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez on June 13, 2007. First
Rainey Aff., Ex. C. At the time the Quitclaim Deed conveying the Property was executed,
Wilfrido had been living on the Property for approximately four years. Cuevas Aff., ii 2. The
Deed, which includes the full parcel number and tax information and complete legal description
of the Property satisfied the requirements of the "complete mailing address" of the grantee. See,

)
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e.g., K.E.B. Enterprises, L.P. v. Smedley, 140 Idaho 746, 752, 101 P.3d 690, 696 (2005) (where
)

evidence showed that information on the face of the deed was sufficient for the grantee to receive
mail, the "complete mailing address" requirement was satisfied); City ofKellogg v. Mission

Mountain Interests LTD, 135 Idaho 239, 243, 16 P.3d 915, 919 (2000) (finding that identification
of the City grantee, with no mailing address, satisfied the "complete mailing address"
requirements of the Idaho Code Section 55-601); and see generally Giacobbi v. Hall, 109 Idaho
293, 707 P.2d 404 (1985) (finding that the failure to provide any mailing address of the grantee
did not deprive said grantee of his interest in the property). Wilfrido recorded the Quitclaim
Deed in Canyon County land records as Instrument No. 2007043067 on June 20, 2007. First
Rainey Aff, Ex. C. These facts establish that Wilfrido is the holder of title and, as such, the law
presumes that he is the owner of the Property.

B.

C)

Idaho's Recording Statutes Establish that Wilfrido's Interest in the Property
is Superior to any Interest Claimed by Barraza.
Because Wilfrido has a valid, duly recorded quitclaim deed conveying all of Juan

Cuevas's and Yrene Baez's interest in the Property to him, the relative priority of the two
adverse claimants is resolved by Idaho's recording statutes. Idaho is a race-notice state. Idaho
Code Section 55-606 provides as follows:
Every grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is
conclusive against the grantor, also against every one subsequently
claiming under him, except a purchaser or encumbrancer, who in
good faith, and for a valuable consideration, acquires a title or lien
by an instrument or valid judgment lien that is first duly recorded.
Similarly, Idaho Code Section 55-812 provides as follows:
Every conveyance of real property other than a lease for a term not
exceeding one (1) year, is void as against any subsequent
purchaser or mortgagee of the same property, or any part thereof,

:)
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in good faith and for a valuable consideration, whose conveyance
is first duly recorded.

)

Under Idaho's race-notice statutes, in order for Barraza to overcome the legal presumption that
Wilfrido is the owner of the property, he must first show that he has legally recognizable claims
to the property and that Wilfrido had knowledge of such claims prior to the time he took title.

See Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch v. Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657,661,962 P.2d 1041, 1045 (1998) (a
party is in good faith unless he has knowledge of "legally recognizable interest that would
constitute an adverse claim on the property."). As the challenger to Wilfrido' s claim of
ownership, Barraza must establish his adverse interest "by evidence that is clear, satisfactory and
convincing." Luce v. Marble, 142 Idaho 264, 270, 127 P.3d 167, 173 (2005) (quoting Russ

Ballard & Family Achievement Inst. v. Lava Hot Springs Resort, Inc., 97 Idaho 572,579, 548
P.2d 72, 79 (1976)). Because Barraza cannot establish that either (i) the Claim of Lien, (ii) the
English Document, or (iii) the Spanish Document create a legally recognizable interest in the
/''

\

\

J

Property, Barraza cannot overcome the presumption that Wilfrido, as the holder of title, is the
owner of the Property and summary judgment quieting title in Wilfrido's name is appropriate.
1.

Barraza admits that Juan Cuevas did not convey legal title to him.

Barraza admitted in a prior affidavit filed with this Court, that Juan Cuevas never
conveyed title of the Property to him. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza dated October 20, 2009
(hereafter, "Barraza Aff.") if 2. Accordingly, to the extent that Barraza establishes any lesser
interest in the Property, it is subject to Wilfrido's ownership, which is established by Wilfrido's
Quitclaim Deed. However, since Barraza cannot establish that he has a legally recognizable
claim to the Property, this Court should quiet title in the property to Wilfrido, free and clear of
any interest claimed by Barraza.
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2.

Barraza's Claim of Lien is not a legally recognizable interest in the
Property.

Barraza relies on the Claim of Lien, recorded in Canyon County on as Instrument
Nos. 200220593, 200666034, and 2007007336. First Rainey Aff., Ex. A. In order for the Claim
of Lien to have any impact on Wilfrido's property rights, Barraza bears the burden of proving
that the lien is legally recognizable. Generally speaking, liens made by a stranger to the title,
without the owner's consent, are insufficient to create a valid, enforceable interest in property.
See Maxwell v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 49 Idaho 806,813,292 P. 232 (1930). Unless a lien is

(i) authorized by statute, (ii) consented to by the owner, (iii) imposed by a court, or (iv) of the
type commonly used in a commercial transaction, it constitutes a nonconsensual common law
lien and is invalid and unenforceable. See IDAHO CODE § 45-1702 et. seq.; see also Browning v.
Griffin, 140 Idaho 598, 599-600; 97 P.3d 465, 466-67 (App. 2004). If a lien is improperly filed

as a mechanic's lien and the lien is not one otherwise recognized by law, then the lien is a
nonconsensual common law lien and is properly subject to a court order removing the lien.
IDAHO CODE§ 45-1703; Browning, 140 Idaho at 601, 97 P.3d at 468; Maxwell, 49 Idaho at
811-14, 292 P. 232.
The cases of Browning and Maxwell establish that, under Idaho law, a
nonconsensual common law lien, such as the one upon which Barraza relies, is invalid,
unenforceable, and subject to removal by the Court. In Browning, the claimant filed a notice of
lien using a form "designed for use by mechanic's lien claimants," but the Idaho Court of
Appeals concluded that the lien was not a mechanic's lien because "it did not claim or imply that
[claimant] contributed labor, equipment, or material for improvement of [subject] property."
Browning, 140 Idaho at 600; 97 P.3d at 468. Instead, the court found that lien purported to

.)
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secure a tort-based claim and that there was no law recognizing such a lien. Id. Accordingly, the
)

court found that the owner of the property was entitled to an order removing the lien because the
claim was an invalid nonconsensual common law lien. Id. at 601, 97 P.3d at 467.
In Maxwell, the claimant filed an equitable lien against property for the reason
that "the owners failed and refused to pay the contract price [for the drilling of wells] in cash or
by note and mortgage" as agreed upon. 49 Idaho at 811,292 P. 232. However, the Idaho
Supreme Court concluded that a claimant had no right to file an equitable lien but instead was
required to seek relief by filing an action in court and give notice of such claim by recording a !is
pen dens. Id.
In this matter, Barraza alleges that he filed the Claim of Lien because Juan
Cuevas failed to transfer title of the property to him. Barraza Aff., ,r 2. As a matter oflaw,
Barraza cannot cite to any legal precept authorizing him to file such Claim of Lien. Like the

(;)

liens filed by strangers to the title in Maxwell and Browning, Barraza's Claim of Lien is an
invalid, nonconsensual common law lien and, as such, it does not give Barraza any interest in the
Property. Because the Claim of Lien does not create a legally recognizable interest in the
Property, even ifWilfrido had full knowledge of the existence, contents, and dispute related to
the Claim of Lien prior to recording the Quitclaim Deed, it would not affect his status as a good
faith purchaser. Accordingly, the Claim of Lien does not establish that Barraza has any interest
in the Property superior Wilfrido's title under the Quitclaim Deed.

3.

Neither the Spanish Document nor the English Document satisfy the
statute of frauds.

The Claim of Lien discussed above was allegedly recorded because Juan Cuevas
failed to convey title to Barraza pursuant to a written contract for the sale of the Property.

:)
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Barraza Aff., ,r,r 1-2. In support of his claim that there was a written contract between himself
)

and Juan Cuevas for the purchase and sale of the Property, Barraza has submitted both the
Spanish Document (Second Rainey Aff, Ex. 3) and the English Document (Second Rainey Aff.,
Ex. 2) in support of his claimed interest in the Property.
In order for Barraza to establish a legally recognizable interest in the Property by
virtue of either the Spanish Document or the English Document, he must first establish that they
satisfy the statute of frauds. If an agreement does not satisfy the statute of frauds, it is
"unenforceable both in an action at law for damages and in a suit in equity for specific
performance." Callies v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841,848,216 P.3d 130, 137 (2009) (quoting Ray v.

Erasure, 146 Idaho 625,629,200 P.3d 1174, 1178 (2009)). Under this authority, a document
that does not satisfy the statute of frauds does not create a legally recognizable interest in
property.

()

Idaho's statute of frauds relating to interests in real property is found at Idaho
Code Section 9-503, which provides as follows:
No estate or interest in real property ... can be created, granted,
assigned, surrendered, or declared, otherwise than by operation of
law, or a conveyance or other instrument in writing, subscribed by
the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring
the same ....
The statute of frauds also requires that the writing contain an adequate legal description of the
property. See Callies v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho 841,848,216 P.3d 130, 137 (2009) (quoting Ray v.

Erasure, 146 Idaho 625, 629, 200 P.3d 1174, 1178 (2009)) (noting that the description must
"adequately describe[] the property so that it is possible for someone to identify 'exactly' what
property the seller is conveying to the buyer."); Lexington Heights v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho
276, 280-81, 92 P.3d 526, 530-31 (2004); Lexington Heights, 140 Idaho at 281, 92 P.3d at 531
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(quoting City of Kellogg v. Mission Mountain Interests Ltd., Co., 135 Idaho 239,244, 16 P.3d
)

915,920 (2000)) (a description is adequate if the "quantity, identity, or boundaries of property
can be determined from the face of the instrument, or by reference to extrinsic evidence to which
it refers.").
The Spanish Document does not satisfy the statute of frauds because it is not
subscribed by the party allegedly conveying the Property nor does it contain an adequate legal
description of the Property. Prior to the alleged sale to Barraza, title to the Property was held in
the names of Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez. Second Rainey Aff., Ex. 1. While the Spanish
Document mentions Juan Cuevas, there is nothing within the Spanish Document purporting to be
his signature. Second Rainey Aff., Exs. 3 and 4. The Spanish Document does not even mention
Yrene Baez, another record owner of the Property; nor does the Spanish Document contain
anything purporting to by the signature ofYrene Baez. Second Rainey Aff., Exs. 3 and 4. The

,

)

Spanish Document also does not contain any legal description of the Property. Second Rainey
Aff., Bxs. 3 and 4. Indeed, the statement that "we need the ranch's address" (Second Rainey
Aff., Bxs. 3 and 4), conclusively establishes that the Spanish Document does not satisfy the
statute of frauds. Because the Spanish Document does not satisfy the statute of frauds, it does
not create a legally recognizable interest in the Property.
Though the English Document comes closer to satisfying the statute of frauds, it
is still insufficient as a matter of law to create legally recognizable property rights. The English
Document does not have a signature for Yrene Baez and the only reference to Yrene Baez is a
misspelling of her name. Second Rainey Aff., Ex. 2. The English Document contains the street
address for the Property (Second Rainey Aff., Ex. 2), but it is well settled that, under Idaho law,
the street address is insufficient and does not satisfy the statute of frauds. See Callies v. 0 'Neal,

)
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147 Idaho 841,848,216 P.3d 130, 137 (2009) (quoting Ray v. Erasure, 146 Idaho 625,629,200
)

P.3d 1174, 1178 (2009)) (holding that a description of property in a written agreement for the
sale of real property that consists solely of a physical address does not satisfy the statute of
frauds). Accordingly, the English Document does not create a legally recognizable interest in the
Property.
Because Barraza cannot establish that he has any legally recognizable claim to the
Property, he cannot overcome the presumption that Wilfrido, as the holder ofrecord title, is the
legal owner of the Property. Accordingly, this Court must grant the present motion for summary
judgment, quieting title to the Property in the name of Wilfrido Cuevas.

C.

Barraza Has Failed to State a Claim for Unjust Enrichment.
In the alternative to Barraza' s action to quiet title, he has also filed a claim against

Wilfrido for unjust enrichment. Whether a party has stated a claim for unjust enrichment is a
( ,
\.

)

question oflaw. Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 338,406, 111 P.3d 73,
78 (2005). In order to state claim for unjust enrichment, Barraza must plead and prove three
elements: (i) that he conferred a benefit on Wilfrido; (ii) that Wilfrido appreciated the benefit;
and (iii) that it would be inequitable for Wilfrido to accept the benefit, without payment of the
value of such benefit. Teton Peaks Investment Co., LLC v. Ohme, 146 Idaho 394, 397, 195 P.3d
1207, 1210 (2008). "The measure of damages for unjust enrichment is 'the value of the benefit
bestowed upon the defendant which, in equity, would be unjust to retain without recompense to
the plaintiff."' Holladay v. Lindsay, 143 Idaho 767, 770, 152 P.3d 638,641 (App. 2006) (citing
Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, 101 Idaho 663,666,619 P.2d 1116, 1119 (1980)).
A claim for unjust enrichment does not exist "where the alleged injured party has
no relationship with the alleged injuring party." Beco Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co.,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF WILFRIDO CUEVAS'
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 13

000334

Client:1741212.3

118 Idaho 463, 466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990). If a party has not conferred a benefit on the other
)

party, either directly or indirectly, then the necessary relationship does not exist for the equitable
doctrine to be applied. Id. at 467, 797 P.2d at 867. In this matter, Barraza has not claimed that
he conferred any benefit on Wilfrido, either directly or indirectly. See, generally, Amended
Answer and Counterclaim at 5-6. Rather, Barraza claims only that both he and Wilfrido had
dealings with Juan, Wilfrido's predecessor in interest, relating to the Property. Because Barraza
has not alleged and cannot prove that he conferred any benefit on Wilfrido, he has not stated a
claim for unjust enrichment. Accordingly, summary judgment on Barraza's unjust enrichment
claim is proper.

V.

CONCLUSION

As the foregoing demonstrates, it is undisputed that Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez
executed a quitclaim deed conveying legal title to Wilfrido Cuevas. Further, there are no
genuine issues of material fact precluding this Court from finding that the three documents upon
which Barraza relies for his alleged interest in the Property are invalid, unenforceable, and do not
create a legally recognizable interest in the Property. For these reasons, Wilfrido respectfully
requests that this Court grant the present motion for summary judgment quieting title to the
Property in the name of Wilfrido Cuevas.
Once title to the property is quieted in Wilfrido Cuevas' s name, the only
remaining claim in this litigation is Barraza' s claim for unjust enrichment. Because Barraza has
failed to state a claim for unjust enrichment and cannot otherwise meet his evidentiary burden of
proving that he conferred a benefit on Wilfrido, Wilfrido respectfully requests that the Court

)
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grant the present motion for summary judgment, ordering that Barraza take nothing by such
~)

claim.
DATED this 31st day of August, 2010.
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

By ! ~ ~ I
'
Rebecca A. Rainey - Of e F rm
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Co

(
'

)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 31st day of August, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF WILFRIDO CUEVAS'
SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:
Robert Ward
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD

340 East 2nd North
Mountain Home, ID 83647
Facsimile (208) 587-3144
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
(X) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Rebecca A. Rainey

.)
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ROBERT WARD
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD
Attorneys for Defendant Bernardino Barraza
340 East 2nd North Street
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
Case No. CV09-8175

WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual,

ANSWERING BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
SECOND MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

0

BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any), LIOBALDO GARZA, an
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED
IN EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN
AS 29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO,
Defendants.
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any);
Counterclaimant,
VS.

WILFRIDO CUEVAS,
Couterdefendant.
COMES NOW the Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, by and through his attorney of record,
Robert Ward of the firm Hall, Friedly & Ward, and hereby lodges his Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment.
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FACTS
On March·6, 2001, Juan Manuel Cuevas sold the real property commonly known as
29452 Pearl Road, Parma, Idaho, (the "real property") to Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, per
written contract. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 1.
On May 6, 2002, Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, recorded a lien with the Canyon County
Recorder's Office against the real property since Juan Manuel Cuevas failed to transfer title of
said real property to Defendant, Bernardino Barraza. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph
2.
Prior to Juan Manuel Cuevas initiating any legal action, Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, called
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, and requested copies of payments and any documents he had in
his possession regarding the transaction between Juan Manuel Cuevas and Defendant,
Bernardino Barraza, with reference to the real property. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza,
paragraph 3.
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, told Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, that Juan Manuel Cuevas
was now wanting to sell the real property to him and that Wilfrido knew that Juan Manuel
Cuevas had previously sold the real property to Defendant, Bernardino Barraza. Affidavit of
Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 4.
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, told Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, that he should demand a
refund of all monies paid to Juan Manuel Cuevas for the real property, so that Wilfrido could buy
the real property instead. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 5.
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, and Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, discussed retaining an
attorney to ensure that Juan Manuel Cuevas was fair and dealing honestly with both parties.
Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 6.

(
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Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, went to meet with Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, about three
(3) days after their conversation but Wilfrido refused to speak with Defendant, Bernardino
Barraza. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 7.
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, and his attorney, Robert Ward, called Plaintiff, Wilfrido
Cuevas, shortly thereafter. Wilfrido stated in his conversation with Defendant and Mr. Ward,
that Defendant had lost all rights to the real property per the Statute of Limitations. Plaintiff,
Wilfrido Cuevas, further stated that he was no longer interested in retaining an attorney to deal
with the purchase of the real property from Juan Manuel Cuevas, and was at that time renting and
maintaining the real property since it belonged to Juan Manuel Cuevas. Plaintiff, Wilfrido
Cuevas, said that Juan Manuel Cuevas was family, and that he no longer wanted to discuss the
real property issue with Defendant, Bernardino Barraza. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza,
paragraph 8.

0

On April 2, 2007, a quiet title action commenced on the real property between Juan
Manuel Cuevas and Defendant, Bernardino Barraza. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph

9.
On June 20, 2007, while the appeal process was pending, Juan Manual Cuevas apparently
quitclaimed his interest in the real property to Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas. Affidavit of
Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 15.
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas', own affidavit states that he was aware of the lawsuit and
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, claims. Affidavit of Wilfrido Cuevas, paragraph 6.
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, also stated in his affidavit that he was aware of Defendant,
Bernardino Barraza' s, recorded lien and that he went to the title company to search records.
Affidavit of Wilfrido Cuevas, paragraphs 6 and 7. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, was aware at this

(
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time that Juan Manuel Cuevas could not give clear title to the real property. A quitclaim deed
(

was executed between Juan Manuel Cuevas and Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, because they could
not get a clear title through the title company.
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, claims that upon paying the remaining balance of his purchase
price, he received his quitclaim deed. Affidavit of Wilfrido Cueavas, paragraph 6.
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, does not have a receipt from Juan Manuel Cuevas for any
payments he claims to have made for the purchase of the property, but merely an unsigned
printout indicating someone deposited money into someone's Wells Fargo account. Affidavit of
Robert Ward in Support of Defendant's Answering Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs Second
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Ward Affidavit"), exhibit 2.
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, claims the payments he made per the Wells Fargo deposit
printouts total $32,467.00, however, some are duplicated and others do not have a deposit

(~:

printout. Affidavit of Wilfrido Cuevas, paragraph 4; Ward Affidavit, exhibit 2.
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, claims his purchase price was $80,000.00. Ward Affidavit,
exhibit 2.
DISPUTED FACTS AS STATED IN PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM
Defendant~ Bernardino Barraza, disputes the facts as stated in Plaintiffs Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and specifically disputes the following.
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, claims in paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support
of Wilfrido Cuevas' Second Motion for Summary Judgment that Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas,
entered into an oral agreement to purchase the real property from Juan Manuel Cuevas.
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, disputes this fact. The Statute of Frauds and parole evidence
rule prohibit Plaintiff from presenting any evidence in this present case regarding an alleged oral

(
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contract between himself and Juan Manuel Cuevas. McGinnis v. Stanfield, 6 Idaho 372 (1898).
('·

Furthermore, oral contracts to transfer real estate are not valid. Idaho Code § 9-503, McGinnis v.
Stanfield at 378, 3 79. Furthermore, Plaintiff advised Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, that he was

only renting the real property from Juan Manuel Cuevas. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza,
paragraph 8.
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, claims in paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support
ofWilfrido Cuevas' Second Motion for: Summary Judgment, that on or about June 13, 2007,
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, paid the remaining balance of the purchase price for the property.
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, disputes this fact. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, in his response to
Interrogatory No. 6, stated his payments are summarized in a list totaling $32,467.00, of which,
some are duplicated. Ward Affidavit, exhibit 2. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, in his response to
Interrogatory No. 8, said the purchase price was $80,000.00. Ward Affidavit, exhibit 2.

Q

Furthermore, Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas', alleged payments are mostly in the amount of$800.00
per month, and Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, told Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, previously that
he was only renting the property from Juan Manuel Cuevas. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza,
paragraph 8.
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, argues that prior to receiving his quitclaim deed, he did not
have notice or knowledge of Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, claims to the property.
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, disputes this fact. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, received his
quitclaim deed on June 13, 2007, however, Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, recorded a lien
against the property on May 6, 2002. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 2. Plaintiff,
Wilfrido Cuevas, told Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, that Juan Manuel Cuevas was now
wanting to sell the real property to Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, and that Wilfrido Cuevas knew

(
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that Juan Manuel Cuevas had previously sold the real property to Defendant, Bernardino Barraza.
(---

Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 4. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, called Defendant,
Bernardino Barraza, and requested copies of Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, payments.
Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 3. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, told Defendant,
Bernardino Barraza, that he should demand a refund of all monies paid to Juan Manuel Cuevas
for the real property, so that Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, could buy the real property instead.
Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 5. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, told Defendant,
Bernardino Barraza, that he lost all of his rights to real property per the Statute of Limitations.
Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 8. On June 20, 2007, Juan Manuel Cuevas,
apparently quitclaim deeded his interest in the real property to Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas.
Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraph 15. At the time Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, received
his quitclaim deed, Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, was aware of the lawsuit between Juan Manuel

Q

Cuevas and Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, however Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, believed that
Juan Manuel Cuevas had prevailed in the lawsuit. Affidavit ofWilfrido Cuevas, paragraph 6.
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, checked the land records in Canyon County prior to recording his
quitclaim deed. Affidavit of Wilfrido Cuevas, paragraph 15.
LEGAL AUTHORITY
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied because Plaintiff has not
shown that there is no dispute of material fact. Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to show that he
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Also, Plaintiff advised the court at the hearing on his
previous Motion for Summary Judgment, that if the court would declare Defendant, Bernardino
Barraza's, prior judgment of quiet title void, this in no way would mean that Defendant,
Bernardino Barraza, did not have a legally recognizable interest in the property.

(
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Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, is requesting the court to grant his Motion for Summary
( -

Judgment by claiming Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, cannot establish a legally recognizable
interest in the property, and also that he cannot claim unjust enrichment.
In the previous litigation between Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, and Juan Manuel
Cuevas, the Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, had
a legally recognizable interest in the property when deciding whether Defendant, Bernardino
Barraza, had a meritorious claim sufficient to set aside default. The Court of Appeals stated on
page 8 and 9 of their 2008 Opinion No. 60, that the written contract between Juan Manuel
Cuevas and Bernardino Barraza could establish that Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, has an
ownership interest in the property and would be entitled to specific performance. Ward
Affidavit, exhibit 1.
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, has paid in full the balance of his purchase price to Juan

()

Manuel Cuevas with the $68,000.00 of foregone rent given to Juan Manuel Cuevas in the amount
of $800.00 per month from August 2003 to the present.
PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGED ORAL CONTRACT
Any alleged oral contract is invalid to transfer real property. LC. § 9-503, also known as
the Statute of Frauds, provides that a contract to transfer an interest in real
property must be in writing. Thus, any alleged oral contract is invalid since it violates the Statute
of Frauds.

Idaho Code§ 9-503. Transfers of real property to be in writing. No estate or
interest in real property, other than for leases for a term not exceeding one (1)
year, nor any trust or power over or concerning it, or in any manner relating
thereto, can be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or declared, otherwise than
1n'. operation of law, or a conveyance or other instrument in writing, subscribed by
the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by
his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. (emphasis added)

(
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The Court in Mcginness v. Stanfield, 6 Idaho 372 ( 1898), held that no interest in real

(~~

estate can be created by an oral contract.
Under the statutes we are unable to hold that title to real estate, or an interest in
real estate, can be established by proof of a verbal transfer. Id. at 378, 379
The Court further held that the property interest per the quitclaim deed could not be effective
prior to the date of the deed.
The deed subsequently procured by her from Glenn, some 14 years after he had
left the country, could only have effect from its date. Id. at 379
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, did not have any interest in the property by means of his alleged oral
contract and the quitclaim deed obtained by Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, could only have affect
from its date in June 2007, which is subsequent to Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, acquiring an
interest in the property, and subsequent to Plaintiff, Wilfridos Cuevas', knowledge of Defendant,
Bernardino Barraza's, prior interest in the property.
The parole evidence rule prohibits Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, from presenting any
evidence in the present case regarding any alleged oral contract to purchase the real property.
The exception of partial performance is based upon the equitable remedy of specific performance
and can only be used in disputes between parties to the oral contract. Mcginness v. Stanfield held
that an oral contract for the sale of real property is not admissible in evidence to establish title
against a stranger to the oral contract. Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, was not a party to the
alleged oral contract, and therefore, Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, is prevented from presenting any
evidence regarding an alleged oral contract.
QUITCLAIM DEED
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas', request for summary judgment based upon Idaho Code§ 55606 is without merit since Defendant, Bernardino Barraza' s, interest in the property was acquired

(
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prior rather than subsequent to the quitclaim deed.
Idaho Code § 55-606 provides as follows:
Every grant or conveyance of an estate in real property is
conclusive against the grantor, also against every one subsequently
claiming under him, except a purchaser or encumbrancer, who in
good faith, and for a valuable consideration, acquires a title or lien
by an instrument or valid judgment lien that is first duly recorded.
(emphasis added)
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, had knowledge of Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, claims
prior to Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, taking title per the quitclaim deed. Affidavit of Bernardino
Barraza, paragraphs 2-8, and 15. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, was aware of the recorded lien and
the lawsuit over title, and had gone to the title company to verify these matters. Affidavit of
Wilfrido Cuevas, paragraphs 6 and 7. Furthermore, Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, had discussed
with Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, the prior sale and whether he should hire an attorney.
Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraphs 4 and 6.
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, could not acquire by quitclaim deed any greater interest than
that held by his predecessor, Juan Manuel Cuevas.

The interest Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas,

acquired with the quitclaim deed is subject to the prior interest of Defendant, Bernardino
Barraza, just as his predecessor's interest was subject to the claims of Defendant, Bernardino
Barraza. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, has what Juan Manuel Cuevas had; a title subject to
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, interest.
BONA FIDE PURCHASES

Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas', request for summary judgment based upon Idaho Code§ 55812 is also without merit since Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, had knowledge of Defendant,
Bernardino Barraza's, claims prior to Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, taking title per the quitclaim

(

deed. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraphs 2-8, and 15. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, was

\
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aware of the recorded lien and the lawsuit over title, and had gone to the title company to verify
these matters. Affidavit of Wilfrido Cuevas, paragraphs 6 and 7. Furthermore, Plaintiff,
Wilfrido Cuevas, had discussed with Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, the prior sale and whether
he should hire an attorney. Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza, paragraphs 4 and 6.
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, is not a bona fide purchaser for value of the real property and
thus his claim to the property is not superior to the interest of Defendant, Bernardino Barraza.
Idaho Code § 55-812. Unrecorded conveyance void against subsequent
purchasers. - Every conveyance of real property other than a lease for a term not
exceeding one (1) years, is void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee
of the same property, or any part thereof, in good faith and for a valuable
consideration, whose conveyance is first duly recorded.

Although Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, recorded his quitclaim deed, he has not shown that
he paid a valuable consideration and acquired his quitclaim deed in good faith.
Furthermore, the court in Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho 218, 526 P.2d 178 (1974), held
()

that one who purchases property with notice of conflicting claims, or fails to investigate an
obvious conflicting claim does not take in "good faith" and will not prevail over a prior
purchaser. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, by his own admission, was aware of the previous quiet
title action. Wilfrido Cuevas was also aware of the lien recorded by Defendant, Bernardino
Barraza, prior to any court action. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, obviously did not take in "good
faith".
STATUTE OF FRAUDS

Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, argues that he should be granted summary judgment because
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza' s, written contract does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds. This
same issue was presented to the Court of Appeals by Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas', predecessor in
interest. The Court of Appeals disagreed and held that the Statute of Frauds was not a bar to
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Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, claims to the property per the written contact. Court of
(:.

Appeals 2008 Opinion No. 60, page 10.

UNJUST ENRICHMENT
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, argues that in the event the court awards the property to
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cueavas, that Wilfrido Cuevas should be granted summary judgment on
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's unjust enrichment claim because no benefit was conferred upon
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas. This is not true. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, would receive by
quitclaim deed, all of the remaining interest of Juan Manuel Cuevas after selling the property to
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza. Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, would also receive the benefit of all
the money Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, paid towards the purchase of the property.
Furthermore, Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, would receive the benefit of the improvements
Defendant, Bernardino Barraza, made to the property.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs Second Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied because he has failed
to show that no material dispute of fact exists and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
DATED this

J!:L day of September, 2010.

(
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon the $ y of September, 2010, I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of Answering Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs Second Motion for
Summary Judgment by the method indicated below, addressed to the following:
REBECCA A. RAINEY
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK
& FIELDS, CHTD.
P.O. BOX 829
BOISE, ID 83701
FAX: (208) 385-5384
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